Articles Posted in BigTech

The Apple Store is in the Crosshairs of US and EU Antitrust and Competition Enforcers

April 9, 2024 | Bona Law PC

Apple is currently feeling the heat from antitrust authorities all over the world. Probably more than ever. Below is an article we recently published in the Daily Journal discussing in some detail the last developments in the Epic Games saga, both in the EU and the US.

Epic Games Has Returned to the Apple Store. Will Apple Throw a Hail Mary?

If you are a developer in the Web3 space trying to access the Apple Store, you should also review this article:

Antitrust, Web3 and Blockchain Technology: A Quick Look into the Refusal to Deal Theory as Exclusionary Conduct

So, what’s on Apple’s plate in the antitrust world on both sides of the pond?

In the European Union, the European Commission has fined Apple over €1.8 billion for abusing its dominant position on the market for the distribution of music streaming apps to iPhone and iPad users (‘iOS users’) through its App Store. The Commission found that Apple applied restrictions on app developers preventing them from informing iOS users about alternative and cheaper music subscription services available outside of the app. Such anti-steering provisions ban app developers from the following:

Informing iOS users within their apps about the prices of subscription offers available on the internet outside of the app.
Informing iOS users within their apps about the price differences between in-app subscriptions sold through Apple’s in-app purchase mechanism and those available elsewhere.
Including links in their apps leading iOS users to the app developer’s website on which alternative subscriptions can be bought. App developers were also prevented from contacting their own newly acquired users, for instance by email, to inform them about alternative pricing options after they set up an account.

At the same time, the European Commission has just opened a non-compliance investigation under the new Digital Markets Act about Apple’s rules on (i) steering in the App Store; (ii) its new fee structure for alternative app stores; and (iii) Apple’s compliance with user choice obligations––to easily uninstall any software applications on iOS, change default settings on iOS and prompt users with choice screens which must effectively and easily allow them to select an alternative default service.

Meanwhile, antitrust enforcement is also heating up for the Cupertino company in the United States.

Besides several private litigation actions, Epic Games recently filed a motion accusing Apple of violating an order issued last year under California law barring anti-steering rules in the App Store.

And just few days ago, the Justice Department, joined by 16 other state and district attorneys general, filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against Apple for monopolization or attempted monopolization of smartphone markets in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. According to the complaint, Apple has monopoly power in the smartphone and performance smartphones markets, and it uses its control over the iPhone to engage in a broad, sustained, and illegal course of conduct. The complaint alleges that Apple’s anticompetitive course of conduct has taken several forms, many of which continue to evolve today, including:

Blocking Innovative Super Apps.Apple has disrupted the growth of apps with broad functionality that would make it easier for consumers to switch between competing smartphone platforms.
Suppressing Mobile Cloud Streaming Services. Apple has blocked the development of cloud-streaming apps and services that would allow consumers to enjoy high-quality video games and other cloud-based applications without having to pay for expensive smartphone hardware.
Excluding Cross-Platform Messaging Apps. Apple has made the quality of cross-platform messaging worse, less innovative, and less secure for users so that its customers have to keep buying iPhones.
Diminishing the Functionality of Non-Apple Smartwatches. Apple has limited the functionality of third-party smartwatches so that users who purchase the Apple Watch face substantial out-of-pocket costs if they do not keep buying iPhones.
Limiting Third Party Digital Wallets. Apple has prevented third-party apps from offering tap-to-pay functionality, inhibiting the creation of cross-platform third-party digital wallets.

The complaint also alleges that Apple’s conduct extends beyond these examples, affecting web browsers, video communication, news subscriptions, entertainment, automotive services, advertising, location services, and more.

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The FTC Keeps Digging Its Own Grave: Microsoft-Activision Merger Deal Can Move Ahead Says Federal Judge in California

July 14, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Steve Cernak and Luis Blanquez

This week a federal judge in California denied a preliminary injunction to block Microsoft’s $68.7 billion merger with Activision Blizzard Inc. Both parties may now move ahead and close the deal––subject to further clearance in the UK and Canada––before the July 18 contractual deadline. The FTC has decided to appeal the Court order. We do not yet know the grounds for the appeal but the Court hammered hard almost every single argument from the agency.

The Order includes a detailed background of this case. In a nutshell, the FTC alleges in its complaint that Xbox-maker Microsoft would be incentivized to block Sony PlayStation access to crucial Activision games, especially the very popular Call of Duty game. Below we discuss the main three key antitrust issues involved.

Market Definition

If any, this might be the only partial victory for the FTC in this case.

The Judge states in the Opinion that at this stage of the litigation the FTC need only make a “tenable showing” and she must accept the market definition proposed by the FTC: The Gen 9 consoles market––with Microsoft’s Xbox and Sony’s PlayStation as the only competitors. But at the same time, she did not shy away from highlighting her doubt about the FTC’s market definition surviving a full-blown court review and that she would likely also include Nintendo’s Switch. Why? Because despite its content and functional differences with the Xbox and PlayStation, the FTC failed to consider whether its price, portability, and battery are factors the customer balances when deciding which console to purchase, and because many of the most popular Activision games are available on the three consoles.

As to the FTC’s additional proposed markets of the multigame content library subscription services and cloud gaming, the Court assumed––without deciding––they were each their own product market.

This is as good as it gets for the FTC in this Opinion.

The Clayton Act Requires Competition to be Harmed Substantially, Which is a Higher Standard

A vertical merger involves companies at different levels of the supply chain and are usually less problematic from an antitrust point of view. That’s why for almost fifty years neither the FTC nor the DOJ rarely challenged them. But that has recently changed under the Biden administration and the new head of the FTC Lina M. Khan.

Indeed, this case is the third recent challenge to a vertical merger. The other two were the Illumina’s acquisition of Grail (currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit; Bona Law filed an amicus brief supporting Illumina’s position) and the Meta-Within transaction. The latter was another unsuccessful attempt by this FTC to block a vertical merger.

All of these challenges have one thing in common: the FTC’s aggressive stretching of the Clayton Act’s coverage. And this last case is no different. Here the District Court–– citing the well-known AT&T acquisition of TimeWarner in 2018 (See United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 189–92 (D.D.C. 2018) states that:

“[T]he outcome “turn[s] on whether, notwithstanding the proposed merger’s conceded procompetitive effects, the [g]overnment has met its burden of establishing, through ‘case-specific evidence,’ that the merger of [Microsoft] and [Activision], at this time and in this remarkably dynamic industry, is likely to substantially lessen competition in the manner it predicts.” See AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1037.

In the Court’s own words: “it is not enough that a merger might lessen competition—the FTC must show the merger will probably substantially lessen competition. That the combined firm has more of an incentive than an independent Activision says nothing about whether the combination will “substantially” lessen competition. See UnitedHealth Grp., 630 F. Supp. 3d at 133 (“By requiring that [the defendant] prove that the divestiture would preserve exactly the same level of competition that existed before the merger, the Government’s proposed standard would effectively erase the word ‘substantially’ from Section 7”).

Thus, like the ALJ in the Illumina case, and the District Court in the AT&T case, Judge Scott Corley once again finds in this case that the FTC did not show anything more than a “mere possibility” of substantial lessening of competition. This is not the right legal test as we have stated in a recent amicus brief in the Illumina case.

Ability and Incentive: Both Necessary to Show a Foreclosure Theory

One of the keystones of the antitrust policy under the Biden-administration has been to challenge previous case law on how to block problematic transactions, both horizontal and vertical. But so far, the agency has not been particularly successful.

Again, in the Court’s own words:

“As a threshold matter, the FTC contends it need only show the transaction is “likely to increase the ability and/or incentive of the merged firm to foreclose rivals.” [ ] For support, it cites its own March 2023 decision in Illumina, 2023 WL 2823393, at *33. The FTC in Illumina reasons:

[t]o harm competition, a merger need only create or augment either the combined firm’s ability or its incentive to harm competition. It need not do both. Requiring a plaintiff to show an increase to both the ability and the incentive to foreclose would per se exempt from the Clayton Act’s purview any transaction that involves the acquisition of a monopoly provider of inputs to adjacent markets. 2023 WL 2823393, at *38 (cleaned up) (emphasis added).

The FTC in Illumina, however, provides no authority for this proposition, nor could it. Under Section 7, the government must show a “reasonable probability of anticompetitive effect.” Warner, 742 F.2d at 1160 (emphasis added). If there is no incentive to foreclose, then there is no probability of foreclosure and the alleged concomitant anticompetitive effect. Likewise, if there is no ability, then a party’s incentive to foreclose is irrelevant.”

Judge Scott Corley makes clear in her Order that to establish a likelihood of success on the merits for a foreclosure theory in this case, the FTC must show that the combined firm (1) has the ability to withhold Call of Duty, (2) has the incentive to withhold Call of Duty from its rivals, and (3) competition would probably be substantially lessened as a result of the withholding.

The Court held that while Microsoft may have the ability to foreclose competition because it would own the Call of Duty franchise, it has no incentive to do so. The Judge supports her conclusion on the fact that: (i) immediately upon the merger’s announcement, Microsoft committed to maintain Call of Duty on its existing platforms and even expand its availability, entering a new agreement to extend Activision’s obligation to ship Call of Duty at parity on PlayStation, (ii) sent Valve a signed letter agreement committing to make Call of Duty available on Steam for ten years, and (iii) expanded Call of Duty to non-Microsoft platforms, bringing Call of Duty to Nintendo’s Switch.

In addition, the Judge noticed that the deal plan evaluation model presented to the Microsoft Board of Directors to justify the Activision purchase price (iv) relied on PlayStation sales and other non-Microsoft platforms post-acquisition, and (v) reflected access to mobile content as a critical factor in favor of the deal.

The Court further concluded that (vi) Microsoft’s witnesses’ testimony consistently confirmed the lack of Microsoft’s plans to make Call of Duty exclusive to Xbox, (vii) Call of Duty’s cross-platform play was critical to its financial success, and (viii) agreed with Microsoft’s arguments anticipating irreparable reputational harm in case of foreclosing Call of Duty from PlayStation.

The judge reached the same conclusion on the likelihood of Microsoft blocking access through online subscription services. As for cloud gaming, the Court was also persuaded by Microsoft’s recent agreements with five cloud-streaming providers to freely license Activision games––including Call of Duty––for ten years, a key factor for the European Commission to also clear the transaction in the EU few months ago.

Following this ruling, Microsoft and UK antitrust officials have agreed to suspend litigation and focus on trying to reach an agreement on how the acquisition might be modified to address any competition concerns.

Supreme Court Case Law Obligates Merger Challenges to Address the Deal and Certain Proposed Fixes

The FTC desperately tried to also show that Microsoft’s binding offer was just a “proposed remedy” that may not be considered until the remedy phase, after a Section 7 liability finding.

As support, it relies on its own 2023 Illumina decision and E.I. du Pont, 366 U.S. But once again the Court disagrees with the FTC:

“E.I. du Pont does not support the Commission’s holding. It involved a remedy proposed after a finding of a Section 7 violation. The Court held: “once the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor.” E.I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 334. E.I. du Pont says nothing about whether the merger-challenging plaintiff must address offered and executed agreements made before any liability trial, let alone liability finding; that is, whether the FTC must address the circumstances surrounding the merger as they actually exist.” This same point is key to the Illumina appeal currently pending in the Fifth Circuit.

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Antitrust, Web3 and Blockchain Technology: A Quick Look into the Refusal to Deal Theory as Exclusionary Conduct

June 17, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Author: Luis Blanquez

A company using a blockchain––or perhaps even the blockchain itself––, with a sizeable share of a market, could be a monopolist subject to U.S. antitrust laws. But monopoly by itself isn’t illegal. Rather, a company must use its monopoly power to willfully maintain that power through anticompetitive exclusionary conduct.

Thus, a monopolization claim requires: (i) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market––i.e. the ability to control output or raise prices profitability above those that would be charged in a competitive market; and (ii) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from attaining it by having a superior product, business acumen, or even an accident of history. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).

The monopolist may also have a legitimate business justification for behaving in a way that prevents other firms from succeeding in the marketplace. For instance, the monopolist may be competing on the merits in a way that benefits consumers through greater efficiency or a unique set of products or services.

There are many ways a company may willfully acquire or maintain such monopoly power through anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. Some of them include exclusive supply or purchase agreements, tying, bundling, predatory pricing, or refusal to deal.

In this article we briefly discuss the refusal to deal theory of harm in the context of web3.

What is Web3?

The internet is an evolving creature. Thirty years ago, web 1.0 was all about browsing and reading information. As a consumer you had access to information, but few were able to publish online.

In the early 2000s the current web 2.0. arrived, and everyone started publishing their own web content and building communities. The problem today is that we have a centralized internet. Very few companies––big online platforms such as Google, Facebook or Amazon––control and own everyone’s online content and data. And they even use all that data to make money through, for instance, targeted advertising.

That’s why web3 is a necessary step in the right direction. As a consumer you can now access the internet without having to provide your personal data to these online gatekeepers. And you don’t need to give up ownership of the content you provide. Plus, you own your digital content and can execute digital agreements using crypto currencies. If wonder how is all that possible, the answer is through a new infrastructure called blockchain.

You can read a broader discussion of antitrust guidelines for companies using blockchain technology here.

Refusal to Deal with Competitors or Customers

Competitors and Rivals

First, an illegal refusal to deal may occur when the monopolist refuses to deal with a competitor or rival. Under US antitrust laws such claims are challenging and rarely successful.

Although a company generally has no duty to deal with its rivals, courts have found antitrust liability in some limited scenarios when a monopolist (i) unilaterally outright refuses to sell a product to a rival that it made available to others (Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–09 (2004), see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601; Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973); OR (ii) had a prior voluntary and presumably profitable course of dealing with a competitor, but then terminated the relationship, giving up short-term profit from it in order to achieve an anticompetitive end. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, 555 U.S. 438, 442, 451 (2009), Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1096 (2014).

Applied to the web3 world, this means that the validators of a blockchain could face antitrust scrutiny only if they had monopoly power, and (i) they previously allowed a competitor access to its blockchain but later agreed to exclude that rival, or (ii) sacrifice short-term profits without a reasonable business justification. This is, of course, unlikely considering the decentralized structure of blockchains and their need for gas fees to keep validators’ business profitable and the chain secured. When the validators are decentralized, they are not a single economic entity for purposes of the antitrust laws. But the risk would still differ depending on the blockchain and the level of decentralization.

What we might eventually see, however, is a company with monopoly power using a blockchain to exclude its rivals from the market through different anticompetitive conduct. For instance, we might see restrictions to only use one blockchain, to use smart contracts to impose loyalty rebates and other barriers to switch between blockchains, conditioning the use of one blockchain for a specific application or product by restricting the use of other blockchain or non-blockchain rivals’ infrastructure, or to require suppliers upstream or end customers downstream, to use the same blockchain for different products or applications.

Customers

Second, a refusal to deal may also take place when a monopolist refuses to deal with its customers downstream or suppliers upstream. A monopolist’s refusal to deal with customers or suppliers is lawful so long as the refusal is not the product of an anticompetitive agreement with other firms or part of a predatory or exclusionary strategy. Note, however, that a monopolist cannot decline to deal with customers as retaliation for those customers’ dealings with a competitor. That is often called a refusal to supply and is in a different doctrinal category than a refusal to deal. But, beyond these anticompetitive exceptions, private companies are typically free to exercise their own independent discretion to determine with whom they want to do business.

This test is broader than the one for competitors and requires a case-by-case legal and economic analysis to determine whether anticompetitive conduct exists. And web3 is not any different in this respect.

The Apple App Store and web3

Let’s take the Apple App Store as an example.

In the web2 world, Apple has created a “walled garden” in which Apple plays a significant curating role. Developers can distribute their apps to iOS devices only through Apple’s App Store and after Apple has reviewed an app to ensure that it meets certain security, privacy, content, and reliability requirements. Developers are also required to use Apple’s in-app payment processor (IAP) for any purchases that occur within their apps. Subject to some exceptions, Apple collects a 30% commission on initial app purchases and subsequent in-app purchases.

There are currently several related ongoing antitrust investigations and litigations worldwide about Apple’s conduct with its App Store. In the U.S., the Court of Appeals from the Ninth Circuit on the Epic Games saga held that Apple should not be considered a monopolist in the distribution of iOS apps. But this ruling also came with a string attached. The judge concluded that Apple did violate California’s unfair competition law and could not maintain anti-steering rules preventing users from learning about alternate payment options. If you want to learn more (see here). Both companies have recently asked the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing and the stakes are high.

Companies in web3 are now starting to deal with similar potentially anticompetitive behavior from web2 big tech companies. Uniswap, StepN and Damus are just three of many recent examples.

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Antitrust for Kids: If You Write A Bad Note, Live with It: Document Preservation in Antitrust Cases

April 11, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Author: Molly Donovan

Gordon was recognized as dominant in the 5th grade class. He had the greatest share of friends and ran the fastest. He was the smartest and won the most academic awards at the end of each school year. He was always chosen as the lead in every school play.

But one day, Gordon’s teacher accused him of cheating. Rather than playing fair, Gordon had excluded a new student, Samuel, from the playground races at school. Samuel showed real promise in track and field and Gordon hated to admit that he felt a bit threatened. Although he knew it was wrong, Gordon wrote a number of notes to classmates telling them to exclude Samuel from all playground races. His teacher, of course, found one of those notes.

That was bad enough, but Gordon went and made everything worse. For use during an upcoming parent-teacher conference, Gordon’s teacher instructed him to collect and keep all the notes he had written to friends demanding that they refuse to race against Samuel. Instead, Gordon shredded the notes and threw away the scraps! Then—and this is the real clincher—Gordon told his teacher, falsely, that he had preserved the notes as instructed.

Obviously, this all came out at the conference. There, the teacher argued that Gordon should be punished for throwing away the notes and lying about their being preserved. Gordon argued that punishment was not necessary—his conduct was not that bad since at least half the notes were to friends who had nothing to do with the boycott of Samuel anyway.

As you might expect, Gordon’s parents agreed with the teacher. The result: Gordon had to give back a significant portion of his monthly allowance and donate it to the school, and further punishment—publicly unknown—would wait until Gordon got home. Eeeek!

Could Gordon continue his dominance after all that? You’ll have to wait for a future Antitrust for Kids to find out.

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Meta/Within Merger Antitrust Opinion: Cutting Edge Tech, Vintage Precedent

February 14, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Steven Cernak and Luis Blanquez

Earlier in February 2023, the Court for the Northern District of California denied the FTC’s preliminary injunction motion to prevent the closing of Meta Platforms Inc.’s acquisition of Within Unlimited, Inc.––a virtual reality (VR) App developer. The FTC has declined to appeal the loss and has paused its administrative in-house challenge. Meta has now closed the transaction. Below we summarize the key points from the opinion and what we think are the two key takeaways for merger practitioners.

Opinion Summary

As with many contested mergers, a key legal battle in this case was market definition. The FTC proposed a relevant product market consisting of VR dedicated fitness apps, meaning VR apps “designed so users can exercise through a structured physical workout in a virtual setting.” The merging parties, on the other hand, alleged that the FTC’s proposed market definition was too narrow, excluding “scores of products, services, and apps” that are “reasonably interchangeable” with VR dedicated fitness apps, including VR apps categorized as “fitness” apps on Meta’s VR platform, fitness apps on gaming consoles and other VR platforms, and non-VR connected fitness products and services”. Extensively quoting Brown Show and that venerable opinion’s “practical indicia” of a market, the Court held that the FTC made a sufficient evidentiary showing of a well-defined submarket, consisting of VR dedicated fitness apps.

Having won that battle, the FTC argued that the proposed acquisition would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition in the market for VR dedicated fitness apps. According to the agency, even though Meta was not currently a competitor in the VR dedicated fitness app market, it was both (i) an actual potential competitor, and (ii) a perceived potential competitor in the relevant market. In the first theory, the FTC argued that the transaction harmed competition because Meta would have entered the market on its own. In the second theory, the FTC argued that Meta’s mere presence on the wings of the market before the transaction kept current participants from acting anticompetitively.

The court denied the FTC’s motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the facts did not support either potential competition theory. The court, however, did find that both theories remained good law and, therefore, are available for the FTC and DOJ to support violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in the future. Merger practitioners will need to learn, or remember, the necessary elements of these theories, including sufficient market concentration and the acquiring party having the necessary characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to enter the market.

Key Takeaway: Old Precedent Comes Back

Most merger practitioners have become used to working with the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) and the opinions that follow their reasoning, especially those from this century. For some practitioners with little to no grey hair, those precedents might be all they have ever known. For example, the district court opinion in AT&T/TimeWarner in 2018 has multiple cites to H.J. Heinz from 2001, Arch Coal from 2004, and Baker Hughes from 1990. Last year’s UnitedHealth/Change opinion cited all those same cases plus Anthem from 2017 and Sysco from 2015. Sure, some older precedent always makes it into opinions and briefs — defendants often cite General Dynamics from 1974 and the government loves 1963’s Philadelphia National Bank — but those exceptions are few.

As the FTC has moved away from the 2010 HMGs but not yet replaced them, practitioners have questioned where to find guidance. If the briefs and opinion in this case are any clue, the answer might be court opinions from forty or more years ago.

For example, look at the cases cited in the potential competition sections of the opinion. Now, it is true that the Supreme Court cases that extensively discuss the theories, such as Marine Bancorp., date from the 1970’s. The district and appellate court cases relied on by the court in the section discussing the continued validity of the actual potential competition theory date from 1984, 1981, 1980, and 1974. The only more recent court opinion mentioned is the FTC’s loss in 2015’s Steris. The Court’s 1973 opinions in Falstaff Brewing gets extensive discussion in ten separate mentions. According to Lexis, that case involving Dizzy Dean’s favorite beer has only been cited twenty times since 2010.

Even when defining the product market, the court spends ten pages going through various indicia found in 1962’s Brown Shoe and only two pages on the hypothetical monopolist test found in the HMGs — and then only “[i]n the interests of thoroughness.” The cases cited in the Court’s legal analysis of product market definition include several from this century but also older ones like Twin City Sports Service (1982), Times Picayune (1953), and Continental Can (1964). So at least until any new Guidelines are issued, merger practitioners might need to spend more time honing arguments based on older cases and less time arguing the intricacies of the HMGs.

Key Takeaway: Competitive Pressure from Apple?

In discussing competition in the VR hardware and various software or app “markets,” the Court describes many different current competitors. While it is difficult to know for certain because of the extensive redactions, it appears that Apple applied extensive competitive pressure on Meta, either as another potential suitor for Within or a current or potential competitor in some VR-related market—or both. Specifically, the judge says in his opinion that Meta was concerned that Apple might “lock in” fitness content (perhaps Within?) that would be exclusive to Apple’s expected VR hardware.

If so, these two Big Tech behemoths pressuring each other, especially in markets neither one dominates, is further support for some of the ideas expressed at least in Nicolas Petit’s Moligopoly Scenario. Paraphrasing one of Petit’s points, these powerful companies might seem like monopolists, but they act more like oligopolists fearful of competitive pressure from other giants and others. In short, none of them wants to miss the next big thing and become the next Blockbuster to some future Netflix. This opinion seems to put considerable weight on contemporaneous documents from Meta and others that describe those types of strategic considerations driving Meta’s behavior. If future cases follow suit, merger practitioners might be able to focus more on well-supported boardroom considerations and less on hypothetical analyses from outside economic experts.

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Observations on the Court’s Rejection of Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss the FTC’s Amended Antitrust Complaint

January 24, 2022 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

The FTC filed an antitrust lawsuit against Facebook (now Meta Platforms Inc.). Judge James E. Boasberg dismissed it. The FTC then filed an amended complaint. And the same judge just denied Facebook’s motion to dismiss that complaint.

The FTC alleges that Facebook has a longstanding monopoly in the market for personal social networking (PSN) services and that it unlawfully maintained that monopoly through (1) acquiring competitors and potential competitors; and (2) preventing apps that Facebook viewed as potential competitive threats from working with Facebook’s platform.

The FTC’s first claim asserts that Facebook monopolized the market through (1), above—acquiring companies (especially Instagram and WhatsApp) instead of competing. The FTC’s second claim includes both (1) and (2), the interoperability allegations, and invokes Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which allows the agency to seek an injunction against an entity that “is violating” or “is about to violate” the antitrust laws.

The Court permitted the FTC to go forward with both claims, but also concluded that the facts from the interoperability allegations happened too long ago to fit into Section 13(b)’s “is violating” or “is about to violate” temporal requirement.

You can read the play-by-play of the opinion elsewhere or, even better, read the actual decision. My purpose with this article is instead to offer some observations about the opinion and broader antitrust litigation issues.

Direct and Indirect Evidence of Monopoly Power

The FTC argues that it has alleged both indirect and direct evidence of Facebook’s monopoly power. But because the Court concluded that the FTC had adequately alleged indirect evidence of Facebook’s monopoly power, it didn’t need to analyze the direct evidence of monopoly power.

The only reason I am bringing this up is because most monopolization cases focus on indirect evidence of monopoly power—i.e. relevant market definitions, market share, barriers to entry, etc.— so many people don’t consider that a plaintiff can also satisfy this element through direct evidence of monopoly power. For example, if a plaintiff can prove that a defendant is engaged in supracompetitive pricing, it is showing direct evidence of monopoly power. And in an antitrust claim against a government entity, the plaintiff may be able to show directly that the public entity is a monopolist as a result of government coercion.

Notably, the Court dismissed the last FTC Complaint against Facebook for failure to allege monopoly power. Here, the Court concludes that “the Amended Complaint alleges far more detailed facts to support its claim that Facebook” has a dominant share of the relevant market for US personal social networking services.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court agreed with the FTC that Facebook’s dominance is durable because of entry barriers, particularly network effects and high switching costs.

Anticompetitive Conduct

The alleged anticompetitive conduct consists of a series of mergers and acquisitions. Within antitrust and competition law, you typically hear about antitrust M&A in the context of Hart-Scott-Rodino filings and direct merger challenges by the FTC or DOJ.

Courts will sometimes conclude that mergers and acquisitions are a means of exclusionary conduct by a monopolist. As in the present case, that can come up when a company that dominates a market confronts a potential competitor and must decide how to respond. Sometimes the monopolist will compete better—reduce prices, improve quality, etc. That’s the way competition works. But in other situations, the monopolist might solve its problem by dipping into its cash or stock and remove the threat to its monopoly profits by buying the nascent competitive threat.

You could also imagine a scenario in which a monopolist engages in exclusionary conduct by going vertical and purchasing either a supplier or customer in a context in which such doing so makes it difficult for the monopolist’s competitors to achieve economies of scale. This can be similar in effect to an exclusive-dealing arrangement.

Harm to Competition

The FTC, of course, must allege harm to competition. The standard harm to competition is an increase in prices or a decrease in quality—which are two sides of the same coin. But these aren’t the only harms to competition that a plaintiff can allege.

Here, of course, the FTC is asserting an antitrust claim centered on purchase of Instagram and WhatsApp, which were free before and after the acquisitions. And the Facebook social network site is, of course, also free.

But the Court concluded that the FTC did, in fact, allege harm to competition. The FTC alleged “a decrease in service quality, lack of innovation, decreased privacy and data protection, excessive advertisements and decreased choice and control with regard ads, and a general lack of consumer choice in the market for such services.” And the FTC emphasized the lower levels of service quality on privacy and data protection resulting from lack of meaningful competition.

The Court accepted these allegations as sufficient harm to competition: “In short, the FTC alleges that even though Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp did not lead to higher prices, they did lead to poorer services and less choice for consumers.”

The question of whether less choice is sufficient harm-to-competition to support an antitrust claim has been controversial over the years, but Courts are increasingly permitting it.

Previously Cleared Transactions

Facebook understandably grumbles that the FTC previously cleared through the HSR process the two transactions that it now complains about. But the Court rejects this argument because it says the “HSR Act does not require the FTC to reach a formal determination as to whether the acquisition under review violates the antitrust laws.” And, in fact, an HSR approval expressly reserves the antitrust enforcers the right to take further action. It doesn’t seem fair, but that’s the way it is.

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The FTC withdraws Vertical Merger Guidelines. Will it take on big-tech small acquisitions next?

September 17, 2021 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Steven Cernak and Luis Blanquez

FTC Chairwoman Lina Khan keeps up her frenetic crusade to change the practice of antitrust enforcement. The new––and surely not last––change: the vertical merger guidelines.

On Wednesday, September 15, 2021, the FTC held an open virtual meeting to discuss the following:

Proposed Withdrawal of 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: The Commission voted on whether to rescind the Vertical Merger Guidelines adopted in June 2020 and the Commentary on Vertical Merger Enforcement issued in December 2020.
Non-HSR Reported Acquisitions by Select Technology Platforms, 2010-2019: Staff presented findings from the Commission’s inquiry into large technology platforms’ unreported acquisitions, including an analysis of the structure of deals that need not be reported to enforcers.
Proposed Revisions to FTC Procedural Rules Concerning Petitions for Rulemaking: The Commission voted on putting in place a process to receive public input on rulemaking petitions by external stakeholders.
Proposed Policy Statement on Privacy Breaches by Health Apps and Connected Devices: The Commission voted to issue a policy statement on the importance of protecting the public from privacy breaches by health apps and other connected devices.

Here, we will only discuss the first two items. For more background on these and other recent changes at the FTC, see our previous articles:

The FTC Continues the HSR Antitrust Process’s “Death of a Thousand Cuts”

FTC Guts Major Benefit of Antitrust HSR Process for Merging Parties

FTC Withdraws Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary

As expected, the FTC on a 3-2 vote decided to withdraw its approval of the Vertical Merger Guidelines, issued jointly just last year with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ), and the FTC’s Vertical Merger Commentary.

According to the FTC’s press release, the guidance documents include unsound economic theories that are unsupported by the law or market realities. The FTC is withdrawing its approval to prevent industry or judicial reliance on this allegedly flawed approach. The FTC reaffirmed its commitment to working closely with the DOJ to review and update the agencies’ merger guidance.

The statements by the various Commissioners show the deep divisions within the FTC since Khan joined the Commission, not just about these Guidelines but more generally about how to enforce the antitrust laws and how to run the FTC. The statement by the FTC majority asserts that the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines had improperly contravened the Clayton Act’s language with its approach to efficiencies. The statement explains the majority’s concerns with the Guidelines’ treatment of the purported pro-competitive benefits of vertical mergers, especially its treatment of the elimination of double marginalization.

The dissenting Statement of Commissioners Phillips and Wilson starts with a bang: “Today the FTC leadership continues the disturbing trend of pulling the rug out under from honest businesses and the lawyers who advise them, with no explanation and no sound basis of which we are aware.” The statement goes on to not only lament the confusion the withdrawal will generate but contrast the process used when the Guidelines were issued — months of public input and debate — with the process used for their withdrawal — no public input and, seemingly, no discussion even at the FTC outside the offices of three Commissioners.

The FTC pledged to work with DOJ to update vertical merger guidance to better reflect how the agencies will review such transactions in the future. Just an hour later, DOJ issued a statement explaining that they are reviewing both the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Vertical Merger Guidelines and, as to the latter, have already identified several aspects of the guidelines, such as the treatment of and burdens for the elimination of double marginalization, that deserve close scrutiny. (We raised those issues when the Guidelines went through public debate last year.) DOJ expects to work closely with the FTC to update the Guidelines so, perhaps, we will have new Guidance at some point in the future.

FTC Staff Presents Report on Nearly a Decade of Unreported Acquisitions by the Biggest Technology Companies

During the same meeting, FTC presented findings from its inquiry into the hundreds of past acquisitions by the largest technology companies that did not require reporting to antitrust authorities at the FTC and DOJ, generally because they were below HSR thresholds. Launched in February 2020, the inquiry analyzed the terms, scope, structure, and purpose of these transactions by Alphabet Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., Apple Inc., Facebook, Inc., and Microsoft Corp. between Jan. 1, 2010 and Dec. 31, 2019.

“While the Commission’s enforcement actions have already focused on how digital platforms can buy their way out of competing, this study highlights the systemic nature of their acquisition strategies,” said Chair Khan. “It captures the extent to which these firms have devoted tremendous resources to acquiring start-ups, patent portfolios, and entire teams of technologists—and how they were able to do so largely outside of our purview.”

The Commission voted 5-0 to make the report public. Chair Khan and Commissioners Chopra and Slaughter each issued separate statements. While the report did not recommend any changes to the merger review process, we expect that the FTC may utilize the report’s findings to recommend changes in the HSR process.

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Facebook Wins First Antitrust Battle: The FTC and State Enforcers Fail to Establish (For Now) Facebook’s Monopoly on Social Media Networks (with update)

September 17, 2021 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Steven J. Cernak and Luis Blanquez

In late 2020, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the attorneys-general (AGs) from 48 states filed nearly identical antitrust lawsuits against Facebook for stifling competition by acquiring potential competitors, mainly Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014, and for enforcing policies that blocked rival apps from interconnecting their product with Facebook. The alleged effect of this conduct was to (i) blunt the growth of potential competitors that might have used that interoperability to attract new users, and (ii) deter other developers from building new apps or features or functionalities that might compete with Facebook.

This week, the judge hearing the cases agreed to dismiss the claims from the FTC––without prejudice––stating that the lawsuit failed to plead enough facts to plausibly establish that Facebook has monopoly power in the personal social networking services market. Likewise, the Court also dismissed ––with prejudice––a similar case pursued by a group of 48 states on the basis that any alleged violations took place too long ago.

While by no means the final decision on these matters, the motion to dismiss opinion will significantly narrow the FTC case for now. It also highlights some of the difficulties that enforcers will face using the current antitrust laws against Big Tech companies.

Online platforms have been––and continue to be––scrutinized by antitrust enforcers around the world. In the U.S. the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee issued last year its long-anticipated Majority Report of its Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets. The Report detailed its findings from its investigation of Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon along with recommendations for actions for Congress to consider regarding those firms. In addition, the Report included recommendations for some general legislative changes to the antitrust laws. Since then, online platforms have been involved in high-profile antitrust litigation in the U.S. So even though Facebook has won the first round of this litigation, the war is far from over.

Chinese Translation: Thank you to our friends at the Beijing Fairsky Law Firm for preparing a translation in Chinese of this article.

Update: Please see an important update about the FTC’s amended complaint at the end of the article.

The FTC and State AGs Parallel Antitrust Complaints against Facebook

Both suits focused on the same Facebook categories of conduct. First were the acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, both of which occurred more than five years ago. These deals allegedly increased Facebook’s power over social media networks, facilitating data integration and its sharing among some of the largest social media platforms. Next was Facebook’s requirement that any applications connecting to Facebook may not compete with Facebook or promote any of Facebook’s competitors. The complaint alleged that Facebook enforced these policies by cutting off access to the Application Programming Interface (“API”), the software that allows applications to talk to one another to allow communication with rival personal social networking services, mobile messaging apps, and any other apps with social functionalities.

Both the FTC and AG suits claimed that Facebook’s actions amounted to illegal monopolization in violation of Sherman Act Section 2. The states’ suit also claimed that the two acquisitions violated Clayton Act Section 7, the statutory prohibition of anticompetitive mergers.

In March Facebook Fired Back in its Motion to Dismiss

In March 2021, Facebook moved to dismiss the suits on several grounds.

First, the company claimed that the complaints did not properly allege a relevant market or that Facebook had monopoly power in any market.

Second, Facebook asserted that the FTC could not claim that the two acquisitions were illegal monopolization because the agency had cleared both transactions earlier under the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification system. Even if the agency could make such a claim, the company claimed that the FTC failed to properly allege that such acquisitions were anticompetitive. (We discussed the concept of post-HSR review both prior to and immediately after the FTC complaint was filed.)

Finally, Facebook claimed that the complaint did not properly allege that the company’s decision not to deal with all potential app developers who were potential competitors was subject to an exception to antitrust law’s usual rule that even monopolists can choose their own partners. Basically, under U.S. antitrust laws if you are a monopolist, you can still refuse to deal with your competitors, unless: (i) you have already been doing business with them, and (ii) by stopping you are giving up short-term profits for the long-term end of knocking them out of the market.

The District Court’s Opinions Dismissing Both Cases

The judge hearing both cases granted Facebook’s motions to dismiss. The Court dismissed the FTC complaint without prejudice. This means that the FTC is allowed to amend its complaint and refile the case, and now has 30 days to do so. The AGs were not that lucky, and the judge dismissed their complaint with prejudice. The Court applied the doctrine of laches to conclude that AGs waited too long to challenge Facebook’s purchases of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014.

The Opinion against the FTC

In the decision re the FTC, the Court found that the complaint fails plausibly to allege how Facebook has a monopoly over personal social networking (“PSN”) services.

As with all monopolization plaintiffs, the FTC must plausibly allege that Facebook has monopoly power in some properly defined market. As do most plaintiffs, the FTC chose to allege this power indirectly by alleging that Facebook has a high share of the market, here for PSN services. Despite some misgivings, the court found that the complaint’s allegations make out a plausible market for PSN services.

But that hardly ends the analysis. The FTC must also explain why Facebook enjoys a high share of that market and, therefore, monopoly power. Here, the court found that the FTC’s allegations were inadequate for two reasons.

First because that “PSN services are free to use, and the exact metes and bounds of what even constitutes a PSN service — i.e., which features of a company’s mobile app or website are included in that definition and which are excluded — are hardly crystal clear.” In other words, the FTC must further explain whether and why other, non-PSN services available to the public either are or are not reasonably interchangeable substitutes with PSN services.

Second, even if the FTC better defines the market(s) of social networking, it must better explain how it developed the allegation that Facebook enjoys a market share of at least 60%: “[T]he FTC’s inability to offer any indication of the metric(s) or method(s) it used to calculate Facebook’s market share renders its vague ‘60%-plus’ assertion too speculative and conclusory to go forward.” Thus, the FTC has also fallen short to plausibly establish the existence of monopoly power by Facebook in the relevant market.

That finding alone was enough to support the court’s granting the motion to dismiss; however, it helpfully went on to discuss Facebook’s other grounds for dismissal.

The court explained that even if the FTC had sufficiently pleaded market power, its challenge to Facebook’s policy of refusing interoperability permissions with competing apps also failed to state a claim for injunctive relief. The Court held in both decisions that there is nothing unlawful about having such a policy in general. While implementation of such a policy can be illegal monopolization in certain limited circumstances, the FTC did not allege such facts. Finally, all such denials of access occurred in 2013, seven years ago. Thus, the FTC lacks statutory authority to seek an injunction from a court for such past conduct.

On the other hand, the court did find that the FTC might be able to seek injunctive relief relating to Facebook’s past acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. While those acquisitions took place years ago, the court found that Facebook’s continued ownership of the companies could be considered a continuing violation of Section 2. While the doctrine of laches does not apply to the US government, including the FTC, the court did note but did not decide several issues, including remedial ones, with such a long-delayed allegation.

The Opinion Against State Enforcers (AGs)

The judge also dismissed the parallel case brought by the AGs. The court explained that unlike the federal government, the states are bound by the doctrine of laches, in which those who “sleep on their rights” and wait too long to file a case cannot seek court relief. As a result, the allegations regarding the Instagram and WhatsApp acquisitions were insufficient to state a claim under either Sherman Act Section 2 or Clayton Act Section 7.

Using an analysis identical to the one used with the FTC complaint, the judge further rejected the AG’s claims that Facebook’s refusal to allow interoperability with competing apps constituted illegal monopolization. Because all of the claims of the AG’s were rejected in ways that cannot be rectified by the AG’s, the judge dismissed the complaint without any chance for the AG’s to modify the complaint and refile.

Final Remarks

At the time of this writing, the FTC is considering possible next steps. It could beef up its allegations regarding the market definition and Facebook’s share of that market and file an amended complaint regarding Facebook’s prior acquisitions. It could also appeal the dismissal of its current complaint.

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Classic Antitrust Cases: Trinko, linkLine and the House Report on Big Tech

October 13, 2020 | Bona Law PC

Author: Steven J. Cernak

On October 6, 2020, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee issued its long-anticipated Majority Report of its Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets. As expected, the Report detailed its findings from its investigation of Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon along with recommendations for actions for Congress to consider regarding those firms.

In addition, the Report included recommendations for some general legislative changes to the antitrust laws. Included in those recommendations were proposals for Congress to overrule several classic antitrust opinions. Because this blog has summarized several classic antitrust cases over the years (see here and here, for example), we thought we would summarize some of the opinions that now might be on the chopping block. This post concerns two classic Supreme Court opinions on refusal to deal or essential facility monopolization claims, Trinko and linkLine.

House Report on Refusal to Deal and Essential Facilities

The Report’s recommendations for general changes in the antitrust laws included several aimed at increasing enforcement of Sherman Act Section 2’s prohibition of monopolization. In particular, the Report recommended that:

Congress consider revitalizing the “essential facilities” doctrine, or the legal requirement that dominant firms provide access to their infrastructural services or facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis. To clarify the law, Congress should consider overriding judicial decisions that have treated unfavorably essential facilities- and refusal to deal-based theories of harm. (Report, pp. 396-7)

The two judicial opinions listed were Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) and Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).

Trinko

Justice Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion dismissing the plaintiff’s refusal to deal claim. There were no dissents although Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas, wrote separately to concur in the result but would have dismissed based on lack of standing.

Since the Supreme Court’s 1919 U.S. v. Colgate (250 U.S. 300) decision, courts have found that “in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,” the antitrust laws allow any actor, including a monopolist, “freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.” Trinko narrowly interpreted the Court’s earlier exceptions to the rule that even a monopolist can choose its own trading partners.

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