Articles Posted in Types of Antitrust Claims

Antitrust-for-Kids-300x143

Author:  Molly Donovan

At Argo Elementary, a group of kids gathers daily at lunch to buy and sell candy. The trading activity is a longtime tradition at Argo and it’s taken very seriously—more like a competitive sport than a pastime.

Candy trading doesn’t end once a 5th grader graduates from Argo. It continues across town at Chicago Middle School—but instead of lunch, candy trading happens there at the close of each school day. (The middle school had banned lunchtime trading due to several disputes that grew out of hand.)

Now here’s where it gets complicated, and nobody knows why it works this way, but the average lunchtime price at Argo determines the starting price for trades later in the day at Chicago.

For example: the average selling price for a candy bar on Monday, lunch at Argo is $2.50. Monday after-school prices at Chicago also will start at $2.50.

There are rules about what kind of candy can be traded—so that one trade can be easily compared to another (candied apples-to-candied apples) for purposes of determining who’s “winning.”

And sometimes kids—particularly the older ones at Chicago—place bets on what will happen on a particular trading day in the future, e.g., I bet prices will reach $3 or I bet no more than 50 candy bars will get sold this Friday.

That’s it by way of background. Here’s our story.

Arthur D. Midland (“ADM”) is 9. He is the link between Argo and Chicago. Each day, ADM leaves Argo Elementary when school lets out, walks to Chicago Middle, announces the “start-of-trade” Chicago price based on the lunchtime Argo price, and Chicago trading begins. (ADM’s mother allows this because ADM’s older brother (Midas) also trades at Chicago—so the two boys can watch each other.)

At the start of the school year, ADM contrived a very clever scheme. He bet Midas that, on Halloween, Chicago prices would be very low—as low as $1. Midas said, “No way! September prices are already at $2.50. If anything, prices will increase as kids go candy crazy in October. I’ll take that bet.”

So, for every candy bar sold at Chicago on Halloween for $1 or less, Midas would owe ADM $1. And for every candy bar sold at Chicago for more than $1, ADM would owe Midas $1.

With that bet front of mind, ADM became the primary candy seller at Argo, and as Halloween neared, he flooded Argo with candy and sold it intentionally at very low prices—50 cents for a Snickers! (ADM had the requisite inventory because he was an avid trick-or-treater and had saved all his Halloween candy from years past.)

Due to ADM’s scheme, Argo prices got so low that some kids packed up their candy and went home—refusing to trade there at all.

Well, Halloween finally came and, as you can imagine, ADM made a killing on the bet—100 candy bars were sold at Chicago on Halloween at less than $1, forcing Midas to pay ADM his entire savings. This more than compensated ADM for whatever losses he incurred for under-selling at Argo.

Once Midas realized ADM’s trick, he was furious. Didn’t ADM cheat? Midas assumed—as did all candy traders—that bets derived from candy sales would be based on real—not artificial—market forces.

Did ADM get away with it?

So far, no.

My Muse: For now, plaintiff Midwest Renewable Energy has survived a motion to dismiss its Section 2 monopolization claim against Archer Daniels Midland.

The claim is based on allegations of predatory pricing—basically that the defendant’s prices were below an appropriate measure of its costs and that the low prices drove competitors from the market allowing the defendant to recoup its losses. (For more on predatory pricing, read here.)

In the ADM case, Midwest alleges that ADM manipulated ethanol-trading prices at the Argo Terminal in Illinois to create “substantial gains” on short positions ADM held on ethanol futures and options contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Because the Argo prices determined the value of the derivatives contracts, by flooding Argo with ethanol that ADM sold at too-low prices, ADM allegedly was able to win big on the derivatives exchange—recouping whatever losses it incurred on the underlying asset.

On its motion to dismiss, ADM argued that Midwest had not sufficiently alleged that ethanol producers had exited the market due to ADM’s low prices or that ADM subsequently recouped its losses in the ethanol market. (ADM classed these arguments as going to antitrust injury.)

The Court agreed that Midwest was required to allege both that rivals exited the market and that recoupment was ongoing or imminent, but the court ruled Midwest’s allegations sufficient to do so.

Specifically, Midwest had alleged that 12 ethanol producers had either stopped or decreased ethanol production—which is enough at the motion to dismiss phase. The court said whether that alleged “handful” of plant closures had a discernible effect on consumers is a fact-intensive analysis not susceptible to resolution on the pleadings.

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Blockchain-and-refusal-to-deal-antitrust-225x300

Author: Luis Blanquez

A company using a blockchain––or perhaps even the blockchain itself––, with a sizeable share of a market, could be a monopolist subject to U.S. antitrust laws. But monopoly by itself isn’t illegal. Rather, a company must use its monopoly power to willfully maintain that power through anticompetitive exclusionary conduct.

Thus, a monopolization claim requires: (i) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market––i.e. the ability to control output or raise prices profitability above those that would be charged in a competitive market; and (ii) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from attaining it by having a superior product, business acumen, or even an accident of history. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).

The monopolist may also have a legitimate business justification for behaving in a way that prevents other firms from succeeding in the marketplace. For instance, the monopolist may be competing on the merits in a way that benefits consumers through greater efficiency or a unique set of products or services.

There are many ways a company may willfully acquire or maintain such monopoly power through anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. Some of them include exclusive supply or purchase agreements, tying, bundling, predatory pricing, or refusal to deal.

In this article we briefly discuss the refusal to deal theory of harm in the context of web3.

What is Web3?

The internet is an evolving creature. Thirty years ago, web 1.0 was all about browsing and reading information. As a consumer you had access to information, but few were able to publish online.

In the early 2000s the current web 2.0. arrived, and everyone started publishing their own web content and building communities. The problem today is that we have a centralized internet. Very few companies––big online platforms such as Google, Facebook or Amazon––control and own everyone’s online content and data. And they even use all that data to make money through, for instance, targeted advertising.

That’s why web3 is a necessary step in the right direction. As a consumer you can now access the internet without having to provide your personal data to these online gatekeepers. And you don’t need to give up ownership of the content you provide. Plus, you own your digital content and can execute digital agreements using crypto currencies. If wonder how is all that possible, the answer is through a new infrastructure called blockchain.

You can read a broader discussion of antitrust guidelines for companies using blockchain technology here.

Refusal to Deal with Competitors or Customers

Competitors and Rivals

First, an illegal refusal to deal may occur when the monopolist refuses to deal with a competitor or rival. Under US antitrust laws such claims are challenging and rarely successful.

Although a company generally has no duty to deal with its rivals, courts have found antitrust liability in some limited scenarios when a monopolist (i) unilaterally outright refuses to sell a product to a rival that it made available to others (Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–09 (2004), see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601; Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973); OR (ii) had a prior voluntary and presumably profitable course of dealing with a competitor, but then terminated the relationship, giving up short-term profit from it in order to achieve an anticompetitive end. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, 555 U.S. 438, 442, 451 (2009), Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1096 (2014).

Applied to the web3 world, this means that the validators of a blockchain could face antitrust scrutiny only if they had monopoly power, and (i) they previously allowed a competitor access to its blockchain but later agreed to exclude that rival, or (ii) sacrifice short-term profits without a reasonable business justification. This is, of course, unlikely considering the decentralized structure of blockchains and their need for gas fees to keep validators’ business profitable and the chain secured. When the validators are decentralized, they are not a single economic entity for purposes of the antitrust laws. But the risk would still differ depending on the blockchain and the level of decentralization.

What we might eventually see, however, is a company with monopoly power using a blockchain to exclude its rivals from the market through different anticompetitive conduct. For instance, we might see restrictions to only use one blockchain, to use smart contracts to impose loyalty rebates and other barriers to switch between blockchains, conditioning the use of one blockchain for a specific application or product by restricting the use of other blockchain or non-blockchain rivals’ infrastructure, or to require suppliers upstream or end customers downstream, to use the same blockchain for different products or applications.

Customers

Second, a refusal to deal may also take place when a monopolist refuses to deal with its customers downstream or suppliers upstream. A monopolist’s refusal to deal with customers or suppliers is lawful so long as the refusal is not the product of an anticompetitive agreement with other firms or part of a predatory or exclusionary strategy. Note, however, that a monopolist cannot decline to deal with customers as retaliation for those customers’ dealings with a competitor. That is often called a refusal to supply and is in a different doctrinal category than a refusal to deal. But, beyond these anticompetitive exceptions, private companies are typically free to exercise their own independent discretion to determine with whom they want to do business.

This test is broader than the one for competitors and requires a case-by-case legal and economic analysis to determine whether anticompetitive conduct exists. And web3 is not any different in this respect.

The Apple App Store and web3

Let’s take the Apple App Store as an example.

In the web2 world, Apple has created a “walled garden” in which Apple plays a significant curating role. Developers can distribute their apps to iOS devices only through Apple’s App Store and after Apple has reviewed an app to ensure that it meets certain security, privacy, content, and reliability requirements. Developers are also required to use Apple’s in-app payment processor (IAP) for any purchases that occur within their apps. Subject to some exceptions, Apple collects a 30% commission on initial app purchases and subsequent in-app purchases.

There are currently several related ongoing antitrust investigations and litigations worldwide about Apple’s conduct with its App Store. In the U.S., the Court of Appeals from the Ninth Circuit on the Epic Games saga held that Apple should not be considered a monopolist in the distribution of iOS apps. But this ruling also came with a string attached. The judge concluded that Apple did violate California’s unfair competition law and could not maintain anti-steering rules preventing users from learning about alternate payment options. If you want to learn more (see here). Both companies have recently asked the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing and the stakes are high.

Companies in web3 are now starting to deal with similar potentially anticompetitive behavior from web2 big tech companies. Uniswap, StepN and Damus are just three of many recent examples.

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Law Library Books

Author: Jarod Bona

Law school exams are all about issue spotting. Sure, after you spot the issue, you must describe the elements and apply them correctly. But the important skill is, in fact, issue spotting. In the real world, you can look up a claim’s elements; in fact, you should do that anyway because the law can change (see, e.g., Leegin and resale price maintenance).

And outside of a law-school hypothetical, it usually isn’t that difficult to apply the law to the facts. Of course, what makes antitrust law interesting is that it evolves over time and its application to different circumstances often challenges your thinking. Sometimes, you may even want to ask your favorite economist for some help.

Anyway, if you aren’t an antitrust lawyer, it probably doesn’t make sense for you to advance deep into the learning curve to become an expert in antitrust and competition doctrine. It might be fun, but it is a big commitment to get to where you would need to be, so you should consider devoting your extra time instead to Bitcoin or deadlifting.

But you should learn enough about antitrust so you can spot the issues. This is important because you don’t want your company to violate the antitrust laws, which could lead to jail time, huge damage awards, and major costs and distractions. And as antitrust lawyers, we often counsel from this defensive position.

It is fun, however, to play antitrust from the offensive side of the ball. That is, you can utilize the antitrust laws to help your business. To do that, you need a rudimentary understanding of antitrust issues, so you know when to call us. Bona Law represents both plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust litigation of all sorts.

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Antitrust-Distribution-2022-Developments-300x153

Author: Steven Cernak

In the antitrust world in 2022, stories about Big Tech, government enforcement, and merger challenges dominated the headlines. But in putting together the 2023 edition of Antitrust in Distribution and Franchising (available for purchase soon!), I found a number of less-famous opinions that US distributors and their counsel should know. Just like last year at this time, I thought it made sense to share some of the research highlights. Below, I summarize opinions on important topics like Robinson-Patman, vertical price agreements, and locked-in consumers.

Robinson-Patman

Robinson-Patman’s Depression-era prohibition of some price and promotion discrimination has not been enforced by the federal antitrust authorities for decades — although, as we discussed recently, that might change soon. Even as government enforcement disappeared, private enforcement continued — again, as we have discussed before. Courts dealing with those private suits have been stingy, sometimes even hostile, in their interpretations of the law — once again, as we have discussed very recently. Two 2022 opinions continued those trends.

In Dahl Automotive Onalaska Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (588 F.Supp. 3d 929, W.D. Wisc.), the defendant paid its dealers a portion of the MSRP of every vehicle sold so long as the dealer was building, or had built, a dealership exclusive to defendant’s brand. Plaintiffs were several small dealers who claimed the payments were harmful price or promotional allowance discrimination because other, larger, dealers sold more cars and so could recoup the cost of the exclusive dealership construction more quickly.

The court granted defendant’s Robinson Patman Act summary judgement motion. The court found that even if the payments allowed larger dealers to recover their construction costs more quickly, “it doesn’t mean that the payments result in price discrimination” because the promised payments merely allowed the dealers to recoup their cost of construction already incurred. Therefore, plaintiffs’ Section 2(a) claim failed. The court also found that the payments were not for “promotional allowances” because the dealership building did not resemble “advertising-related perks.” The court agreed with prior courts that had “concluded that buildings where sales occurred were not promotional facilities.” Therefore, plaintiffs’ Section 2(d) claim failed.

In In re Bookends & Beginnings LLC (2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152596, S.D.N.Y.), plaintiff independent booksellers claimed that major publishers and Amazon violated various laws, including Robinson-Patman Section 2(a), when the publishers granted Amazon a larger discount than it granted plaintiffs. The magistrate judge recommended granting defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim because the Morton Salt inference of competitive injury was inappropriate when the actual discount to Amazon was not known or alleged and there was no other factual support for the complaint’s “conclusory allegation” that the discount was “steep,” “huge,” or “substantial.

Vertical Price Agreements and Retailer Cartels

As we have discussed on the blog, the Leegin case changed the evaluation of vertical price agreements under federal antitrust law from per se illegality to a rule of reason analysis. But while the Court found that such agreements were not always anticompetitive, it did discuss some situations when they might be anticompetitive: For example, when “there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel.” The Court also expressed concern if the restraint were imposed by a manufacturer or retailer with market power.

In Davitashvilli, et. al. v. GrubHub Inc. (2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58974 S.D. N.Y.), purported classes of restaurant customers survived a motion to dismiss their claims that defendants, three of the most popular online platforms for meal deliveries, harmed competition through vertical price agreements. The three defendants require the restaurants whose meals they deliver to charge the same price to customers using defendants’ services as those customers dining in and/or using a competitive delivery service. Plaintiffs likened defendants to the retailers and the restaurants to the manufacturers in Leegin, a comparison the court found “somewhat strained” but “plausible.” Because of the alleged market power of each or all of the defendants, plaintiffs plausibly claimed that the restaurants were forced to work through defendants and raise their prices to the purported classes of diners to recoup some of their additional costs.

Market Power Over Locked-In Customers

In the Supreme Court’s classic tying case, Kodak, the defendant required purchasers of replacement parts for its copiers to also purchase copier service from it. Because defendant often was the only seller of those parts, plaintiffs claimed that defendant had market power sufficient to force customers to accept this tie. Defendant, and the Court’s dissent, argued that defendant could not have power in the aftermarket for parts for its copiers because it had no power in the foremarket for copiers. The Court’s majority responded that defendant could have market power over that subset of its customers who were “locked in” to defendant’s copiers, perhaps because they purchased a copier before defendant adopted its tying policy and because switching to a different copier was costly. As a result, defendant’s summary judgment motion in Kodak was denied.

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Antitrust-Group-Boycott-300x200

Author: Jarod Bona

Do you feel paranoid? Maybe everyone really is conspiring against you? If they are competitors with each other—that is, if they have a horizontal relationship—they may even be committing a per se antitrust violation.

A group boycott occurs when two or more persons or entities conspire to restrict the ability of someone to compete. This is sometimes called a concerted refusal to deal, which unlike a standard refusal to deal requires, not surprisingly, two or more people or entities. This antitrust claim fits into Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which requires a meeting of the minds, i.e an agreement or conspiracy.

A group boycott can create per se antitrust liability. But the per se rule is applied to group boycotts like it is applied to tying claims, which means only sometimes. By contrast, horizontal price-fixing, market allocation, and bid-rigging claims are almost always per se antitrust violations.

We receive a lot of questions about potential group boycott actions. This is probably the most frustrating type of antitrust conduct to experience as a victim. Companies often feel blocked from competing in their market. They might be the victim of marketplace bullying.

You can also read our Bona Law article on five questions you should ask about possible group boycotts.

Many antitrust violations, like price-fixing, tend to hurt a lot of people a little bit. A price-fixing scheme may increase prices ten percent, for example. Price-fixing victims feel the pain, but it is diffused pain among many. Typically either the government antitrust authorities or plaintiff class-action attorneys have the biggest incentive to pursue these claims.

Perpetrators of group-boycott activity, by contrast, usually direct their action toward one or very few victims. The harm is not diffused; it is concentrated. And it is often against a competitor that is just trying to establish itself in the market. The victim is often a company that seeks to disrupt the market, creating a threat to the established players. This is common. Of course, excluding or limiting competitors from a market may also create diffused harm among customers or sellers for those excluded competitors.

The defendants may act like bullies to try to keep that upstart competitor from gaining traction in the market. Sometimes trade associations lead the anticompetitive charge.

Group boycott activity often occurs when someone new enters a market with a different or better idea or way of doing business. The current competitors—who like things just the way they are—band together to use their joint power to keep the enterprising competitor from succeeding, i.e. stealing their customers and market share.

Sometimes group-boycott claims are further complicated when the established competitors—the bullies—use their relationships with government power to further suppress competition. Indeed, sometimes the competitors actually exercise governmental power.

This is what occurred in the NC Dental v. FTC case (discussed here, and here; our amicus brief is here): A group of dentists on the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners engaged in joint conduct, using their government power, to thwart teeth-whitening competition from non-dentists.

This, in my opinion, is the most disgusting of antitrust violations: a group of bullies engaging government power to knock out innovation and competition. And we, at least in the past, have watched the Federal Trade Commission take a pro-active role against such anticompetitive thuggery.

Group Boycotts and ESG

An increasingly prominent example of a group boycott that you should watch for are companies that coordinate their ESG policies such that they exclude competitors that decline to accept these rigid restrictions. You can see how this could develop: A group of companies in an industry decide that they want to win some PR points by announcing ESG policies, but quickly realize that this decision increases their own costs such that they can’t offer products or services that are of competitive quality and price with those in their industry that focus on the consumer. So they coordinate together and try to stop suppliers from dealing with this consumer-friendly company, or engage in other collective tactics to exclude this lower-priced competition. There is a good chance that these actions create antitrust liability for the coordinating ESG companies. And as the FTC recently reiterated, ESG does not create antitrust immunity.

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exclusive-deailng-300x200

Author: Jarod Bona

Sometimes parties will enter a contract whereby one agrees to buy (or supply) all of its needs (or product) to the other. For example, a supplier and retailer might agree that only the supplier’s product will be sold in the retailer’s stores. This usually isn’t free as the supplier will offer something—better services, better prices, etc.—to obtain the exclusivity.

If you compete with the party that receives the benefit of the exclusive deal, this sort of contract may aggravate you. After all, you have a great product, you offer a competitive price, and you know that your service is better. Then why is the retailer only buying from your competitor? Shouldn’t you deserve at least a chance? Isn’t that what the antitrust and competition laws are for?

Maybe. But most exclusive-dealing agreements are both pro-competitive and legal under the antitrust laws. That doesn’t mean that you can’t ever bring an antitrust action under exclusive dealing and it doesn’t mean you won’t win. But, percentage-wise, most exclusive-dealing arrangements don’t implicate the antitrust laws and are uncontroversial.

You can read our article about exclusive dealing at the Bona Law website here.

It is important that I deflate your expectations a little bit at the beginning like this because if you are on the outside looking in at an exclusive-dealing agreement, you are probably angry and you may feel helpless. From your perspective, it will certainly seem like an antitrust violation. And your gut feeling about certain conduct is a good first filter about whether you have an antitrust claim. What I am trying to tell you is that with regard to exclusive dealing, your gut may offer some false positives.

Of course, the market is full of exclusive or partial-exclusive dealing agreements and there are relatively few of these that turn into federal antitrust litigation. So if you see an exclusive-dealing claim in federal litigation, it may be one of the rare instances of an exclusive-dealing antitrust violation. Clients and prospective clients often contact Bona Law about exclusive-dealing agreements that are antitrust violations or close to antitrust violations. And we counsel clients on their own exclusive-dealing agreements. But people don’t call us for most varieties of exclusive dealing, which are perfectly legal under the antitrust laws.

So what is an exclusive dealing agreement?

An exclusive dealing agreement occurs when a seller agrees to sell all or most of its output of a product or service exclusively to a particular buyer. It can also happen in the reverse situation: when a buyer agrees to purchase all or most of its requirements from a particular seller. Importantly, although the term used in the doctrine is “exclusive” dealing, the agreement need not be literally exclusive. Courts will often apply exclusive dealing to partial or de facto exclusive dealing agreements, where the contract involves a substantial portion of the other party’s output or requirements. And if there are only two competitors in a market, for example, the exclusive-dealing agreement may take the form of the more powerful of the two competitors telling customers that if they want the powerful company’s products or services, they can’t also purchase from the other competitor.

You should also understand that loyalty-discount agreements and exclusive dealing agreements are, under the law, sometimes indistinguishable.

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bid-rigging-antitrust-300x200

Author: Jarod Bona

You can buy and sell products or services in many different ways in a particular market.

For example, if you want to purchase some whey protein powder, you can walk into a store, go to the protein or smoothie-ingredient section, examine the prices of the different brands, and if one of them is acceptable to you, carry that protein powder to the register and pay the listed price.

Similarly, if you want to purchase a drone from New Bee Drone, you find the manufacturer’s product in a store or online and pay the listed price. Oftentimes products like this, from a specific manufacturer, are the same price wherever you look because of resale price maintenance or a Colgate policy (to be clear, I am not aware of whether New Bee Drone has any such program or policy). But these vertical price arrangements are not the subject of this article.

Another approach—and the true subject of this article—is to accept bids to purchase a product or service. Governments often send out what are called Requests for Proposals (RFPs) to fulfill the joint goals of obtaining the best combination of price and service/product and to minimize favoritism (which doesn’t always work).

But private companies and individuals might also request bids through RFPs. Have you ever renovated your house and sought multiple bids from contractors? If so, that is what we are talking about.

What is Bid-Rigging?

Let’s say you are a bidder and you know that two other companies are also bidding to supply tablets and related services to a business that provides its employees with tablets. The bids are blind, which means you don’t know what the other companies will bid.

You will likely calculate your own costs, add some profit margin, try to guess what the other companies will bid, then bid the best combination of price, product, and services that you can so the buyer picks your company.

This approach puts the buyer in a good position because each of the bidders doesn’t know what the others will bid, so each potential seller is motivated to put together the best offer they can. The buyer can then pick which one it likes best.

But instead of bidding blind, what if you met ahead of time with the other two bidding companies and talked about what you were going to bid? You could, in fact, decide among the three of you which one of you will win this bid, agreeing to allow the others to win bids with other buying companies. In doing this, you will save both money and hassle.

The reason is that you don’t have to put forth your best offer—you just have to bid something that the buyer will take if it is the best of the three bids. You can arrange among the three bidders for the other two bidders to either not bid (which may arouse suspicion) or you could arrange for them to bid a much worse package, so your package looks the best. The three bidders can then rotate this arrangement for other requests for proposals. Or you offer each other subcontracts from the “winner.”

If you did this, you’d save a lot of money, in the short run.

Of course, in the medium and long run, you might learn more about criminal antitrust law and end up in jail. You could also find yourself on the wrong side of civil antitrust litigation.

This is what is called bid-rigging. It is one of the most severe antitrust violations—so much so that the courts have designated it a per se antitrust violation.

Bid rigging is also a criminal antitrust violation that can lead to jail time. And it often leads to civil antitrust litigation too. Many years ago, when I was still with DLA Piper, I spent a lot of time on a case that included bid-rigging allegations in the insurance and insurance brokerage industries called In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation.

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Blockchain-Ethereum-Merge-Group-Boycotts-300x200

Author: Luis Blanquez

Blockchain is an emerging technology that is already changing the way companies do business. But this doesn’t precludn companies using such nascent technology frot getting caught in the same old anticompetitive practices subject to the antitrust laws.

Before diving into the spectrum of anticompetitive behavior that companies using blockchain technology might get involved, let’s first explain below what distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) and blockchain mean, and what are––at least for now––the different types of blockchains.

In the last section of this article, we also analyze how antitrust group boycotts could apply in a blockchain-setting. And we provide two real life recent examples, the Bitmain case and the Ethereum Merge.

What Is Blockchain Technology?

A “blockchain” is a decentralized, electronic register in which transactions and interactions can be recorded and validated in a verifiable and permanent way. A peer-to-peer network where different users or “nodes” share and validate information in a database or network without the need of a centralized and trusted intermediary.

Records of transactions are stored along with other transactions into blocks of data that are linked to one another in a chain, creating a blockchain, which is a type of distributed ledger technology (“DLT”). Each ledger is tamper-proof and recorded using a consensus verification algorithm that encoded every prior block in the blockchain. Once a block is added to the chain, it is virtually impossible to modify. Any change would require modifying every subsequent block of data on the chain. And because each participant on the blockchain has a unique identification key, other users can instantly verify prior transactions involving that participant.

Bitcoin is the first and most prominent use of blockchain technology and has several features that distinguish it from other blockchains, including actual digital scarcity with a programmed limit of 21 million Bitcoin, forever.

With the help of Web3, blockchain technology has opened the door for companies across many industries––not just cryptocurrencies––to make more efficient, inexpensive, and secure business transactions without the need for a centralized authority. In other words, this a whole new ballgame.

Types of Blockchains: Permissionless v. Permissioned

There are two main types of blockchains.

Permissionless (public) blockchains are publicly available and fully decentralized DLTs, which means there is no central authority involved. They allow everyone to interact and participate in the validation process because they are based on open-source protocols, providing strong security. Validators must all vote to adopt the protocols and code that become the decision-making process of the blockchain. This makes it very difficult to change the behavior of the blockchain. Transactions are also fully transparent, and the nodes involved are almost always anonymous. They have, however, some technical restraints such as (i) less control over privacy (everyone has access to what is going on in the blockchain); and (ii) lower scalability and level of performance than permissioned blockchains––mainly due to the wide scope of their verification process and the amount of information they need to process.

Permissioned (private and consortium) blockchains are made by a smaller pool of validators who are partially decentralized DLTs. Only few known (as opposed to anonymous) and previously identified parties can access the ledger and participate in the validation process. Participants need permission to have a copy of the ledger. Thus, even though there is no central authority involved, a short group of participants validate and share the data relevant to transactions. This means less transparency and a higher risk of collusion and abuse of market power because only few nodes manage the transaction verification and consensus process. On the flip side, privacy is stronger, and they are more scalable and customizable.

This distinction is important to identify and analyze antitrust issues, depending on the type of blockchain involved. But the more the blockchain technology develops, the more those differences have become blurred. A combination of small permissioned blockchains with more open, wider, and decentralized ones (although sometimes still using encrypted transactions) had become a common trend. Interoperability between blockchains and existing network externalities are both expected to keep verification prices down while increasing security. In the end, the final configuration of a blockchain and its software code will depend on the strategy and business model selected, which is something that needs to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, considering the industry and applications involved.

The same applies to the enforcement of antitrust laws to this new technology. That’s why it is essential that companies using blockchain technology have a clear antitrust compliance policy in place and train their key employees accordingly. This is particularly important for those involved with the business strategy of the company and the ones interacting on a regular basis with competitors.

Group Boycotts: The Bitmain case and the Ethereum “Merge”

Private blockchain participants may breach antitrust rules if they exclude competitors from the blockchain without a legitimate business justification. Those who control the blockchain may limit potential competitors access to the chain or may not allow them to conduct transactions therein. This is called a group boycott or a concerted refusal to deal—where multiple entities combine to exclude or otherwise inhibit another party. When that “concerted” boycott involves market power or horizontal control over an essential facility or resource, courts typically always analyze it under the “per se” rule.

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Tying Agreement (Rope)

Author: Jarod Bona

Yes, sometimes “tying” violates the antitrust laws. Whether you arrive at the tying-arrangement issue from the perspective of the person tying, the person buying the tied products, or the person competing with the person tying, you should know when the antitrust laws forbid the practice. Even kids may want to know whether tying violates the antitrust laws.

Most vertical agreements—like loyalty discounts, bundling, exclusive dealing, (even resale price maintenance agreements under federal law) etc.—require courts to delve into the pro-competitive and anti-competitive aspects of the arrangements before rendering a judgment. Tying is a little different.

Tying agreements—along with price-fixing, market allocation, bid-rigging, and certain group boycotts—are considered per se antitrust violations. That is, a court need not perform an elaborate market analysis to condemn the practice because it is inherently anticompetitive, without pro-competitive redeeming virtues. Even though tying is often placed in this category, it doesn’t quite fit there either. Again, it is a little different.

Proving market power isn’t typically required for practices considered per se antitrust violations, but it is for tying. And business justifications don’t, as a rule, save the day for per se violations either. But, in certain limited circumstances, a defendant to an antitrust action premised on tying agreements might defend its case by showing exactly why they tied the products they did.

At this stage, you might be asking, “what the heck is tying?” Do the antitrust laws prohibit certain types of knots? Do they insist that everyone buy shoes with Velcro instead of shoestrings? The antitrust laws can be paternalistic, but they don’t go that far.

A tying arrangement is where a customer may only purchase a particular item (the “tying” item) if the customer agrees to purchase a second item (the “tied” item), or at least agree not to purchase that second item from the seller’s competitors. It is sort of like bundling, but there is an element of express coercion. When the seller prohibits the buyer from purchasing a product from the seller’s competitor, this is often called a negative tie.

With bundling, a seller may offer a lower combined price to buyers that purchase two or more items, but the buyers always have the right to just purchase one of the items (and forgo the discount). With tying, by contrast, the buyer cannot just purchase the one item; if it wants the first item, it must purchase the second or at least decline to purchase the second from the seller’s competitor.

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Author:  Molly Donovan

Mr. Potter grows the best pumpkins in town. They’re big and round, perfect for carving, and specially treated with a patented spray that keeps Potter pumpkins squirrel-free for weeks. Genius!

Naturally, all the kids in town buy their Halloween pumpkins from Mr. Potter’s farmstand. They’re a bit more expensive than the competition’s pumpkins, but the price tag is worth the pumpkin perfection.

One thing the kids don’t buy at Mr. Potter’s farmstand: apple cider donuts. Everyone knows that Potter skimps on the cinnamon and sugar and the donuts are too dry besides. The other donuts available in town are loads better.

Seeing that his donuts were mostly going to waste, Mr. Potter could have exited the donut business altogether, but he considered himself a better business person than that. So, here’s what Mr. Potter came up with: no donuts, no pumpkins.

Eeek! Scary.

Mr. Potter made a sign reading:

One pumpkin + ½ dozen donuts = $12. Pumpkins NOT sold separately.

Mr. Potter felt this was perfectly fair—he should be rewarded for his ingenuity and his climb to the top of the local pumpkin market even if his customers felt a bit coerced to buy his donuts.

And the kids did feel coerced—having no choice but to swallow the undesirable donuts to get the pumpkins they needed for Halloween carving.

The donut competitors in town were equally mad. Mr. Potter’s scheme caused their sales to drop off dramatically, practically excluding them from the donut market, at least during the month of October.

But it is what it is, right?

Wrong. Fortunately for everyone (except Mr. Potter), Mikey’s mom happened to be an antitrust lawyer. (Mikey, age 4, was a connoisseur of both donuts and pumpkins, and was understandably very upset over the whole thing.)

When Mikey’s mom learned of Mr. Potter’s Halloween trick she said: this is an antitrust violation called tying!

Tying can run afoul of state and federal antitrust laws. Generally, tying is where a seller makes the sale of one product (or service) contingent on the sale of another product (or service)—leaving the consumer with no choice but to buy both. In tying analyses, most courts look at whether the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product (pumpkins) to unfairly restrain competition in the tied product (donuts).

Here’s what happened next. Mikey’s mom approached Mr. Potter—”Look,” she said. “We want your pumpkins, but not your donuts. Don’t you know this is an antitrust violation? Your donut tie-in is anticompetitive.”

Mr. Potter – clever as he is – responded, “I’m simply making my donuts more competitive. My competition is free to sell pumpkins and donuts together, just as I’m doing. And, I have no real market power for pumpkins anyway when considering the entire county’s many pumpkin patches (beyond just our small town). Plus, my supposed tie has no effects beyond the month of October anyway—no harm, no foul. I’ll take the risk.”

But after giving it more thought, even if he could win a lawsuit, Mr. Potter did not want to invite an expensive and burdensome antitrust litigation. So as most antitrust disputes go, the matter was settled.  Potter agreed to the following: Potter pumpkins sold at wholesale to all local donut shops. The town’s best apple cider donuts sold wholesale to Mr. Potter. No ties, no tricks. The result: Halloween treats for all sold at competitive prices, and everyone lived happily ever after. Until the next Halloween anyway…

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