Altria-Antitrust-Merger-FTC-300x200

Authors: Steven Cernak and Luis Blanquez

The FTC’s challenge of Altria Group’s proposed minority investment in JUUL Labs, Inc. (JLI) in April 2020 generated attention in both the mainstream media and the competition law press. Press coverage since that time has hit the latest developments but often missed the important issues this challenge raises: When can parties reach an anticompetitive agreement before they sign their official merger documents? Non-compete agreements have been pilloried lately, but are they anticompetitive even in a partial merger situation like this one?

This summary should help you prepare for the September 12 oral arguments in front of the Commissioners. You can read Steve Cernak’s more detailed article on these issues for the Washington Legal Foundation here.

The Parties and the Transaction

Altria, together with its subsidiaries, is the largest and one of the oldest cigarette companies in the U.S. In addition to its other products, it also sold e-cigarettes during the relevant period. JLI, is a smaller, newer company focused only on e-cigarettes.

As with most antitrust matters, especially merger investigations, market definition was contentious. Generally, e-cigarettes are electronic devices that aerosolize nicotine-containing liquid using heat generated by a battery as the user puffs. Open system e-cigarettes contain a reservoir that a consumer can refill with their choice of a nicotine-containing liquid. Closed system e-cigarettes have a container that already contains that liquid. Closed systems include cig-a-likes, which mimic the shape and look of a traditional cigarette, as well as pod products that have various shapes, including a shape like a USB thumb drive.

The e-cigarette category began growing rapidly about ten years ago. A few companies offered different options. Altria offered cig-a-like products and then pod products, but JLI offered only pod products. At the time of the challenged transaction, pods were the dominant choice of consumers, with JLI’s product the market leader.

While sales of pods, especially JLI’s pods, grew strongly at the end of 2017, Altria was only selling cig-a-likes and their sales fell. For regulatory reasons, Altria sought to purchase an existing pod product because it couldn’t develop its own product in a reasonable timeframe. In late 2017, it licensed the rights to a Chinese pod product and rushed it to market in early 2018.

Altria then approached JLI in early 2018 about an acquisition. By the end of July, the up-and-down negotiations centered around a multi-billion-dollar investment by Altria in exchange for a minority interest in JLI, possibly a non-voting interest convertible to voting after antitrust clearance. (An acquisition of non-voting securities does not require Hart-Scott-Rodino approval; conversion of such securities does.) At this point, the parties were far from reaching a deal, but began to discuss two other items that would lead to the FTC’s challenge of the eventual transaction.

The ironic first issue was how the parties could obtain antitrust clearance for the entire transaction. The parties’ term sheet described cooperation with the FTC and agreement to any “concessionary requirements of the FTC” related to Altria’s e-cigarette business. That is, the parties agreed that Altria would “divest (or if divestiture is not reasonably practicable, contribute at no cost to [JLI] and if such contribution is not reasonably practicable, then cease to operate” Altria’s e-cigarette business. JLI did not want to compete with Altria because Altria, as a major JLI shareholder, would have access to important JLI information. JLI’s executives later testified that they expected the FTC to oversee this process.

Second, in exchange for regulatory aid, Altria would agree to not compete with JLI’s e-cigarette products. Again, JLI didn’t want Altria’s to access sensitive JLI information when performing these services would allow Altria to improve its current e-cigarette products (before divestiture) or develop better new ones.

While negotiating over financial considerations and Altria’s voting rights, the parties continued to refine these two items. In later term sheets, the requirement that Altria “cease to operate” its e-cigarette assets disappeared while the requirement that Altria either contribute those assets to JLI or divest them remained.

Negotiations broke down in early September, but improved in October as Altria came around to terms much closer to JLI’s proposals. In early December, Altria announced that it was pulling its remaining e-cigarette products from the market, allegedly to conserve costs for product development or to invest in JLI. The parties finally reached an agreement later in December.  Altria then ceased its other e-cigarette development efforts.

The Challenge and Initial Decision

On April 20, 2020, the FTC issued a two-count administrative complaint against the parties. Count I alleged an unreasonable agreement by which Altria agreed not to compete with JLI in the e-cigarette market “now or in the future” in exchange for the ownership interest in JLI. Specifically, that agreement took the form of the non-compete provisions of the written agreement as well as an agreement to exit the market reached during negotiations as a “condition for any deal.” Count II alleged that the transaction, including the agreed upon market exit by Altria and the written non-compete provisions, violated Clayton Act Section 7’s prohibition of mergers that “substantially lessen competition” in the relevant market.

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Toys R Us Antitrust Conspiracy

Author: Jarod Bona

Like life, sometimes antitrust conspiracies are complicated. Not everything always fits into a neat little package. An articulate soundbite or an attractive infograph isn’t necessarily enough to explain the reality of what is going on.

The paradigm example of an antitrust conspiracy is the smoke-filled room of competitors with their evil laughs deciding what prices their customers are going to pay or how they are going to divide up the customers. This is a horizontal conspiracy and is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.

Another, less dramatic, part of antitrust law involves manufacturers, distributors, and retailers and the prices they set and the deals they make. This usually relates to vertical agreements and typically invites the more-detailed rule-of-reason analysis by courts. One example of this type of an agreement is a resale-price-maintenance agreement.

But sometimes a conspiracy will include a mix of parties at different levels of the distribution chain. In other words, the overall agreement or conspiracy may include both horizontal (competitor) relationships and vertical relationships. In these circumstances, everyone in the conspiracy—even those that are not conspiring with any competitors—could be liable for a per se antitrust violation.

As the Ninth Circuit explained in In re Musical Instruments and Equipment Antitrust Violation, “One conspiracy can involve both direct competitors and actors up and down the supply chain, and hence consist of both horizontal and vertical agreements.” (1192). One such hybrid form of conspiracy (there are others) is sometimes called a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy.

In a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, a hub (which is often a dominant retailer or purchaser) will have identical or similar agreements with several spokes, which are often manufacturers or suppliers. By itself, this is merely a series of vertical agreements, which would be subject to the rule of reason.

But when each of the manufacturers agree among each other to enter the agreements with the hub (the retailer), the several sets of vertical agreements may develop into a single per se antitrust violation. To complete the hub-and-spoke analogy, the retailer is the hub, the manufacturers are the spokes and the agreement among the manufacturers is the wheel that forms around the spokes.

In many instances, the impetus of a hub-and-spoke antitrust conspiracy is a powerful retailer that wants to knock out other retail competition. In the internet age, you might see this with a strong brick-and-mortar retailer that wants to protect its market power from e-commerce competitors.

The powerful retailer knows that the several manufacturers need the volume the retailer can deliver, so it has some market power over these retailers. With market power—which translates to negotiating power—you can ask for stuff. Usually what you ask for is better pricing, terms, etc.

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Golf-TRO-Antitrust-PGA-300x180

Author: Luke Hasskamp

Two days before the FedEx Cup Playoffs—a federal court in San Francisco denied three players’ requests for an order allowing them to participate in the marquee event. Those three players—Talor Good, Hudson Swafford, and Matt Jones—had asked the court to immediately enjoin their recent suspensions, handed down by the PGA Tour, but District Court Judge Beth Labson Freeman denied the request, holding the players did not meet their legal and evidentiary burden to show that they would be “irreparably harmed” if barred from the sport’s end-of-season playoff series.

By way of background, the PGA has banned from PGA Tour events any player who chooses to participate in events held by rival upstart league LIV Golf.

The ban includes the FedEx Cup Playoffs—a three-tournament series to conclude the PGA Tour’s season. The top 125 tour players are eligible to participate in the playoffs, which represent a significant accomplishment and “gateway” for players. Not only is lots of money at stake in the playoffs themselves, but there are important implications for a player’s future career. After the playoffs, the top 30 players qualify for next year’s Tour Championship and all four Major Championships, while the top 70 players qualify for all Tour events.

Only three of the 11 plaintiffs in the PGA Tour lawsuit—Gooch, Swafford, and Jones—sought the temporary injunction (called a “TRO”) because these three would have otherwise qualified for the FedEx Cup Playoffs but for their suspensions. Indeed, when the players launched the lawsuit, Gooch was ranked 20th, Jones was 62nd, and Swafford was 63rd, all comfortably within required standings.

In considering a request for a TRO, courts generally consider four elements: (1) whether the players are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the players are likely to suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief; (3) whether the balance of equities tip in the players’ favor; and (4) whether the injunction is in the public interest. The players requesting the TRO needed to establish all four elements to be entitled to the relief.

In general, TROs are hard to get because courts are typically reluctant to grant quick, injunctive relief on a limited evidentiary record. And as to irreparable harm in particular, a loss of money by itself is not considered irreparable harm, meaning if money damages could make a party whole, injunctive relief is not appropriate.

Here, after a hearing lasting more than two hours, featuring extensive argument by attorneys for the players and the PGA Tour, the court found that the players failed to show that they would suffer irreparable harm without immediate injunctive relief.

Although Judge Freeman agreed that the FedEx Cup Playoffs were important, marquee events, she cited, on the other hand, the substantial money that the players were making as part of their contracts with LIV Golf, plus the fact that the players’ contracts with LIV Golf specifically contemplated they would lose significant money if they had to miss out on the FedEx Cup playoffs (and other PGA Tour events). The players understood that risk, and, indeed, it was part of their negotiations with LIV Golf—allowing them (arguably) to extract more money from LIV Golf because of the possibility of a PGA ban. Judge Freeman also noted that the players would make significantly more money as part of the LIV Golf series than they might make in the FedEx Cup playoffs. Thus, she could not see how the players would suffer irreparable harm.

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Antitrust-for-Kids-300x143

Authors:  Molly Donovan & Luke Hasskamp

Liv is 8. She just moved to town from out of state and has 3 new neighbor friends Paul, Greg and Adam (“PGA”). The PGA kids seem very nice and well mannered. They wear pastels. And the coolest thing about them: they have a mini-golf course they built in their backyard years ago. It is touted as the best and most exclusive place for kids to play golf and rightly so. All the best mini golfers play there and only there. Frankly, there is no real competition for mini golf in the county.

Even though Liv is new to town, she thinks she has the chops to build a mini-golf course that rivals her neighbors’. Her house is bigger, her backyard is bigger, her parents will buy better equipment, and Liv is going to award the winner of each round a very fancy prize. Kids are thrilled—and one by one, even the best mini golfers start trying Liv’s course.

PGA is not happy. Stunned that Liv would challenge their longstanding position as the best and only course in town, they unilaterally announce that any kid who chooses to play in Liv’s yard will be banned from their original and still most popular and reputable course. Players must choose: one course or the other, but not both.

(The antitrust lawyer is growing concerned. This sounds like a monopolist trying to bully an emerging competitor by cutting off access to customers. What’s worse, Paul and Greg might be depriving kids of meaningful choice when it comes to mini golf.)

And for sure, the kids are upset, but they’re also a bit confused. On the one hand, any business owner has the right to choose with whom they will deal, right? On the other hand, PGA’s decision to punish kids who want to play at Liv’s every once in a while seems wrong.

The kids call their antitrust lawyer, and here’s what she says: you all should file a class action on behalf of every kid in town who wants to play at both courses and have a real choice when it comes to mini golf competition. The PGA contingent is not competing on the merits, that is, they are not getting mini golfers to come to their course by making it better. Instead, they are monopolists who are using their dominance unfairly to box out a nascent competitor. I’ll represent you, although I’m not sure what your monetary damages are. We could try to get an injunction but I’ll need a retainer for that.

Unable to raise enough funds for the retainer, the kids simply call up PGA demanding that their ban be ceased or else nobody will sit with them at lunch or play with them at recess. That did the trick and the ban was called off immediately. Now kids can play at both mini golf courses!

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Colgate Doctrine

Author: Jarod Bona

As an antitrust boutique law firm, we receive a varied assortment of antitrust-related questions. One of the most common topics involves resale-price maintenance.

That is, people want to know when it is okay for suppliers or manufacturers to dictate or participate in price-setting by downstream retailers or distributors.

I think that resale-price maintenance creates so many questions for two reasons: First, it is something that a large number of companies must consider, whether they are customers, suppliers, or retailers. Second, the law is confusing, muddled, and sometimes contradictory (especially between and among state and federal antitrust laws).

If you want background on resale-price maintenance, you might also review:

Here, we will discuss alternatives to resale-price maintenance agreements that may achieve similar objectives for manufacturers or suppliers.

The first and most common alternative utilizes what is called the Colgate doctrine.

The Colgate doctrine arises out of a 1919 Supreme Court decision that held that the Sherman Act does not prevent a manufacturer from announcing in advance the prices at which its goods may be resold and then refusing to deal with distributors and retailers that do not respect those prices.

Businesses (with some exceptions) have no general antitrust-law obligation to do business with any particular company and can thus unilaterally terminate distributors without antitrust consequences. Before you rely on this, however, you should definitely consult an antitrust attorney, as the antitrust laws create several important exceptions, including refusal to deal, refusal to supply, and overall monopolization limitations.

Both federal and state antitrust law focuses on the agreement aspect of resale-price maintenance agreements. So if a company unilaterally announces minimum prices at which resellers must sell its products or face termination, the company is not, strictly speaking, entering an agreement.

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Yang Yang

Author: Yang Yang.

Ms. Yang is an Antitrust Partner at Fairsky Law Firm, which has a New York office. She is also a lecturer and researcher at China University of Political Science and Law. She authored a treatise on China Merger Control and is a member of the expert advisory team for Amendments to China Anti-Monopoly Law (with a total number of 8 members). Indeed, she leads the drafting of an expert report on suggested amendments to China Merger Control regime, Chapter 4 of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law. She is also a frequent contributor to the Antitrust Report of LexisNexis and Competition Policy International (Asia Column and Asia Chronicle).

On June 24, 2022, the Chinese Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed amendments to the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, which will come into force on August 1, 2022. These amendments have been the first ones since the first adoption of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law in 2008.

They cover the following topics: (i) antitrust investigations by the Chinese Antirust Bureau under the SAMR, (ii) merger control review by the Chinese Antitrust Bureau under the SAMR, and (iii) civil litigation or private actions seeking damages or claiming invalidations of contractual provisions based on a violation of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law. These amendments mark significant changes to China’s antitrust regime.

You might also enjoy the following articles that I’ve authored on The Antitrust Attorney Blog:

Antitrust Merger Control in China: Notifiable Transactions under the People’s Republic of China Anti-Monopoly Law

Draft Amendment to Chinese Antitrust Law Calls for Further Clarifications

Administrative Enforcement by Chinese Antitrust Bureau

With regard to antitrust investigations by Chinese Antirust Bureau under the SAMR, the changes primarily relate to (a) vertical agreements––i.e., RPM; (b) hub-and-spoke agreements, and (c) to the abuse of dominance by internet/technology companies.

Vertical Agreements

These amendments introduce a new “safe harbor” rule for vertical agreements based on the market share of investigated parties in their relevant markets. They now supply more detailed guidance on relevant-market definition, including specific precedents for certain industries. This guidance reduces uncertainty for the investigated parties.

Hub-and-Spoke Agreements

Hub-and-spoke agreements involve manufactures and distributors not entering directly into Resale Price Maintenance provisions (RPM), but rather holding meetings to facilitate horizontal agreements. These fall within the scope of prohibited horizontal agreements in Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law.

For any investigation relating to horizontal or vertical agreements, there is also a new issue of whether any party to such agreements has hosted meetings, organized exchanges of information, or provided substantial facilitation. This also calls for more future guidance from the regulators.

Abusive Conduct by Technology Companies

For internet companies, the provision on prohibiting abusive conduct by algorithms or platform policies is not new. Algorithms and platform policies are commonly used by internet companies. But this new provision may indicate a potential priority from law enforcement. This seems to be consistent with merger control rules and the Chinese Antitrust Bureau’s priority relating to markets impacting the national economy and people’s daily lives, which includes areas of public facilities, pharmaceutical manufacturers and internet platforms.

Merger Control

In the merger control realm, there are three main changes: (i) notification of voluntary transactions, (ii) the introduction of a “Stop the Clock” mechanism, and (iii) a new merger review process by categories and levels. These changes can cause the following uncertainties in practice and may require more detailed guidance.

Notification of Voluntary Transactions

Under this new provision the Chinese Antitrust Bureau has the power to require parties to notify transactions before they are implemented if there is evidence of potential anticompetitive effects. There is no mandatory obligation, however, to notify transactions that do not trigger the relevant merger thresholds before their implementation.

But, despite the new law, current rules do encourage voluntary transactions involving, for example, active pharmaceutical ingredients. These changes create uncertainty on whether the authority has any power to reverse such transactions or impose remedies after their implementation.

In addition, under the new law, the authority must first require the parties to notify the transaction. If the parties do not comply with the notification request, the authority will initiate an official investigation. This process allows the parties to provide evidence and prove that the transaction does not have anticompetitive effects. The authority then has the power to approve (with or without remedies), or prohibit the transaction.

“Stop the Clock” Provision

The new “Stop the Clock” provision grants the authority more time to review the transaction if the notifying parties fail to provide documents on time. At the same time, the notifying parties will now have more time to respond to the authority and to other parties’ concerns.  But under the current law and rules, the authority usually requires the parties to withdraw and refile a notification if the review process has reached the 180-day deadline. Therefore, the new law may restrain the Chinese Antitrust Bureau from extending an investigation longer than 180 days. We will have to see what happens.

New Merger Review Process by Categories and Levels

Finally, the new merger review process by categories and levels calls for more detailed rules on implementation and policies and creates uncertainty as to whether some industries will have higher scrutiny than others.

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EC-Distribution-Agreements-Antitrust-300x214

Authors: Luis Blanquez and Steve Cernak

The adoption of the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines has created a hectic few months in the European Union for those in the world of antitrust and distribution agreements.

1. The European Commission updates existing vertical rules

On May 10, 2022, the European Commission (EC) adopted the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER), together with the new Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. The core of applicable rules to vertical agreements––those entered into between undertakings operating at different levels of the distribution chain––remains the same, but the EC has now introduced some significant changes, especially for online sales and platforms. The new VBER entered into force on June 1, 2022, and will expire on May 31, 2034. There is also a transitional period of one year for those agreements already in force that satisfy the conditions for exemption under the old VBER, but do not satisfy the conditions under the new VBER.

Like the old, the new VBER allows parties to vertical agreements to determine their compatibility with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), by establishing a safe harbor exemption. In a nutshell, when the share of both buyer and seller does not exceed 30% of the relevant market, and absent any “hardcore restrictions” such as territorial or customer restrictions or resale price maintenance among others, their vertical agreements are automatically exempted. Agreements that do not satisfy the VBER conditions may still qualify for an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.

a. Dual Distribution

Dual distribution happens when a supplier is both active upstream, at the wholesale level, but also downstream, selling directly to end customers in competition with other retailers. For instance, through its own online shop or a marketplace.

The new VBER––similarly to the old draft––covers dual distribution as a safe harbor, even though it excludes vertical agreements between competitors. But the new draft includes two important nuances:

  • First, the protection is now extended to cover not only manufacturers, but also importers and wholesalers. With one wrinkle: The so called “hybrid function”. Vertical agreements involving online intermediation services (OIS)––such as those provided by marketplaces or app stores among others––, where the provider acts as both a reseller of the same intermediated goods or services and competes with the same companies to which it provides those OIS, are excluded from the exception.
  • Second, it introduces a novel two-prong test to determine when information exchanges in a dual distribution scenario are exempted: (i) when they are directly related to the implementation of the vertical agreement; and (ii) they are also necessary to improve the production or distribution of the contract goods or services. The Guidelines also provide (i) a non-exhaustive “white list” of examples that benefit from the exemption, such as technical information, or recommended or maximum resale prices, among others; and (ii) a “black list” of information exchanges not covered––such as information related to future prices downstream, etc…

b. Parity Obligations / MFNs

Parity obligations, also known as Most Favored Nation clauses or MFNs, require the seller to offer to the purchaser the same or better conditions offered: (i) to those on any other retail sales channel or platforms (wide parity clauses), or through the seller’s direct sales channel, usually its own online website (narrow parity clauses).

Under the new VBER, wide parity clauses are not covered anymore, and companies need to assess them under the individual exemption of Article 101(3) TFEU. But there is again one wrinkle: When it comes to narrow parity obligations in vertical agreements involving the provision of OIS, they may be still excluded from the block exemption in highly concentrated markets with cumulative effects and lack of efficiencies.

c. Exclusive and Selective Distribution Systems

The new VBER updates the old definitions of active sales (seller actively approaches a customer) and passive sales (unsolicited request from customer) in light of the new online business environment. For instance, an online website making sales with a domain name from a territory different from the one the distributor is established, or even just using a different language to the one officially established in that territory, is now considered an active sale.

It also introduces what is called “shared exclusivity,” which is the ability to designate up to five exclusive distributors per territory or customer group.

A supplier may also now require exclusive (as opposed to selective) distributors to impose those same restrictions on active sales to their direct (as opposed to indirect) buyers or territories exclusively allocated to other distributors. But a supplier passing on the same restrictions further down the distribution chain is not block exempted. This is a significant difference from selective distribution systems, where the supplier is allowed to impose such restrictions through the whole distribution chain.

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Resale-Price-Maintenance-Toys-300x252

Author: Jarod Bona

If you are looking for controversy, you came to the right place. Today, we discuss resale price maintenance, one of the most contentious issues in all of antitrust. If you look around and see a bunch of antitrust economists, hide your screen so they don’t start arguing with each other. Trust me; you don’t want to be stuck in the crossfire of that.

Let’s start with some background: A resale price maintenance agreement is a deal between, for example, a supplier and a retailer that the retailer will not sell the supplier’s product to an end user (or anyone, for that matter) for less than a certain amount. It is a straight vertical price-fixing agreement.

That type of agreement has a storied—and controversial—past. Over a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court in a case called Dr. Miles declared that this type of vertical price fixing is per se illegal under the federal antitrust laws. This is a designation that is now almost exclusively limited to horizontal agreements.

During the ensuing hundred years or so, economists and lawyers debated whether resale price maintenance (RPM) should be a per se antitrust violation. After all, there are procompetitive reasons for certain RPM agreements and the per se label is only supposed to apply to activity that is universally anticompetitive.

After a trail of similar issues over the years, the question again landed in the Supreme Court’s lap in a case called Leegin in 2007. In a highly controversial decision that led to backlash in certain states, the Supreme Court lifted the per se veil from these controversial vertical agreements and declared that, at least as far as federal antitrust law is concerned, courts should analyze resale price maintenance under the rule of reason (mostly).

You can read more about Leegin and how courts analyze these agreements here. And if you want to learn more about how certain states, like California, handle resale price maintenance agreements, you can read this article. Finally, if you are looking for a loophole to resale price maintenance agreements, read our article about Colgate policies and related issues.

Minimum advertised pricing policies (MAP) are related to resale price maintenance: you can read our article on MAP pricing and antitrust here.  You might also want to read Steven Cernak’s article about the four questions you should ask before worrying about the antitrust risks of new distributor restraints. And you can listen to a podcast with Molly Donovan and Steve Cernak about MAP Pricing here.

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PGA-Suspension-Antitrust-300x228

Authors: Luke Hasskamp and Molly Donovan

We often write about sports and antitrust and have previously written about professional golf, and, specifically, the legal implications of a competitor golf league trying to break onto the scene:

The new league, LIV Golf, seeks to compete with the PGA Tour, as well as the European tour (known as the DP World Tour). Indeed, LIV Golf held its first event this past weekend in London, which included 48 participants. Of those, 17 players were members of the PGA Tour. Charl Schwartzel emerged as the winner of the “richest tournament in golf history,” taking home $4.75 million in prize money, which was more than he won during the last four years combined.

In response, the PGA Tour handed down harsh discipline to those 17 players who joined LIV Golf, suspending them indefinitely. The PGA Tour also promised to suspend any other players that participate in future LIV Golf events. It’s a dramatic step, and surely not the last word on the matter.

Now, let’s say you’re one of those 17 players who has been suspended, or you’re a member of the PGA Tour considering playing for LIV Golf but you’re facing such a ban. There are many things to consider, of course. But let’s focus on your legal options. Would the PGA Tour’s ban of a player that chooses to participate in a competitor’s event be lawful? Do the federal antitrust laws in the United States provide you any remedies? Potentially. Let’s take a closer look.

Section 2 of the Sherman Act – Monopolization

Federal antitrust laws make it illegal for a monopolist to preserve its dominant market position through anticompetitive conduct. Here, the PGA Tour sure looks like a monopoly. It’s the dominant actor in the professional golf market in the United States, with revenues well exceeding $1 billion per year. If you are an elite professional golfer in the United States, it’s pretty much the only place to play. (Actually, the PGA Tour, in this context, looks more like a monopsony, as it’s the dominant purchaser of labor in the professional golf market.)

But being a monopoly is not illegal by itself. Instead, there must be some anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct that harms competition in the market.

Typical examples of procompetitive conduct include lowering prices, improving quality, enhancing services, or, in the labor market, raising wages and improving benefits. Antitrust laws like these types of behavior because they enhance competition and are good for consumers. A monopoly that holds onto its dominant market position by offering the lowest prices and the best product is generally a good thing and something antitrust laws seek to encourage. Similarly, a monopsony employer that attracts and retains the best employees by paying the highest wages, offering the best benefits, and otherwise creating the most attractive work environment is the type of outcome that is perfectly acceptable from an antitrust perspective.

Anticompetitive conduct can be harder to define, but can include things like threatening customers or employees, an exclusionary boycott, bundling, tying, exclusive dealing, disparagement, sham litigation, tortious misconduct, and fraud. We’re looking for improper attempts by a monopolist to box out a competitor.

When we look at the current PGA Tour dispute and its decision to suspend players who play for LIV Golf, it seems at least arguable that the PGA Tour’s conduct is anticompetitive. They are not attempting to retain the best golfers by raising compensation, creating more opportunities, or otherwise enhancing the work environment for its players. Instead, the PGA Tour is punishing players who choose to participate in a rival’s events. The conduct appears designed to stifle a would-be competitor.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act – Agreements

Federal antitrust laws also analyze agreements by two or more parties that restrain trade in the market. And agreements between horizontal competitors are closely scrutinized under the per se standard.

Consider professional baseball’s long and storied antitrust history. Those antitrust disputes started (more than 100 years ago) because teams had collectively agreed not to sign each other’s players. Back then, baseball contracts included a “reserve clause,” which reserved a team’s right to a player in perpetuity. Thus, once a player signed with that team, he was only able to re-sign in following years with that same team (unless the team released him). All teams agreed to honor each other’s reserve clauses by agreeing to not sign another team’s players, even if his contract had expired. The reserve clause intentionally suppressed competition by, in essence, preventing free agency. It suppressed players’ salaries. With only one team competing for a player’s services, rather than a full league, teams avoided bidding wars and players had little recourse but to accept the amount offered by their team.

Here, we’d ask whether the PGA Tour has entered into any agreements (formal or otherwise) with another party that restrain trade in the market for professional golf services. There is at least some indicia of such agreements. The European tour (the DP World Tour) has hinted that it may follow the PGA Tour’s approach to dealing with members would participate in LIV Golf. This may stem from the PGA Tour’s “strategic alliance” with the DP World Tour. This sure looks like it could be a horizontal agreement between competitors. Other entities may also be considering similar agreements with the PGA Tour, including the PGA of America, which runs the PGA Championship, one of golf’s four majors, as well as the Ryder Cup, a wildly popular team competition between players from the United States and Europe. The PGA of America, a separate entity from the PGA Tour, has suggested that it is likely to not permit LIV Golf players to participate in the PGA Championship or Ryder Cup.

Of course, sometimes competitors will follow each other’s policies, prices, or practices without an agreement of any sort. That is called conscious parallelism and is not an agreement in restraint of trade because there is no agreement. We don’t know whether there is an agreement here or the European Tour is merely following the PGA Tour in a round of conscious parallelism.

Remedies

A plaintiff prevailing on an antitrust claim has a right to treble damages, which is three times their actual damages, as well as attorney fees.

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