Articles Posted in Antitrust News

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Author: Luis Blanquez

On August 31, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and 22 state attorneys general sued Amazon in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The case is Federal Trade Commission v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:26-cv-03097-JHC (W.D. Wash.), before Judge John H. Chun.

For years Amazon told advertisers it ran a second price auction—the winner pays a penny more than the next highest bid. The government alleges Amazon quietly stopped doing that, layered a hidden surcharge on top of the auction result, and charged winners with their own maximum bid. According to the FTC, the scheme “likely illegally extracted over 20 billion dollars” from more than a million advertising customers.

Amazon calls the case “misguided” and it could take years to litigate. But the advertisers who paid those surcharges do not have to wait for the government to finish. The businesses that spent the most on Amazon ads carried the largest overcharges, and for them the question raised by this Complaint is whether to bring a direct-action claim against Amazon for these overcharges.

Disclosure: Bona Law brought an antitrust case against Amazon on behalf of Zulily that is ongoing as of the date of this article.

The Complaint

According to the governments’ complaint, since at least 2012, and in materials that ran through 2026, Amazon told advertisers its Sponsored Ads auctions were “generalized second-price,” or GSP (¶ 2). The pitch appeared in Ads Academy courses, on Amazon’s YouTube channel, in developer guides, in partner agency training, and in decks shown to large advertisers. Amazon’s promise to advertisers was to bid your true value, because you will only ever pay a cent more than the runner up. Amazon’s own training told advertisers their cost “may actually be lower than your bid, because Amazon Ads uses a second price auction.” (¶ 122).

The Complaint alleges that starting in late 2018 for Sponsored Brands and mid 2019 for Sponsored Products, Amazon began overriding those auction results. It ran the GSP auction, produced a price, and then transformed that price into a higher final charge using an undisclosed “soft reserve.” Internally, the government says, Amazon called these “post hoc pricing adjustments” and acknowledged they carried “an element of unfairness” (¶ 49). A markup applied after the auction ran, capped only by the advertiser’s own maximum bid. Portions of the complaint the FTC and the states unsealed on November 5, 2026, now put numbers on that markup. The hidden “soft reserve” can raise prices by as much as 50% on an ordinary day, and by as much as 250% on special shopping days like Prime Day or Black Friday (¶ 50).

In other words, the Complaint effectively alleges that Amazon manufactured a fake second bid. One senior scientist described it as “an invented auction participant representing how much Amazon thinks that particular ad slot is worth” (¶ 10). The head of Amazon Ads described a “proxy 2nd price that we calculate” (¶ 3).

The share of clicks where the winner paid its own maximum bid—the “first price rate,” the opposite of what Amazon allegedly advertised—climbed from roughly four percent in late 2020, to 30 to 40% in 2021, to 70% in 2022, and to about 79% in 2024 (¶¶ 65, 189). For Sponsored Brands, Amazon charged winners their own bid roughly half the time by 2024. Even though Amazon still described the auction as second price, it had, according to the government, become a first-price auction for most advertisers.

Then there is the concealment, which is the heart of the state consumer protection claims and any private fraud theory. The complaint quotes Amazon employees with unusual candor. “We don’t tell them about the surcharge, we let them assume GSP-based” (¶ 52). “All of our proposals are about how we can tune parameters to increase prices and move away from a GSP while hoping that advertisers don’t notice” (¶ 54). When a December 2021 surcharge increase produced a sudden price spike and more than 20 complaints from large advertisers, the government alleges Amazon assembled a response team—including the people who had raised the surcharge—and told customers the spike came from “higher shopper activity” (¶¶ 227–229). It repeated that explanation during Prime Day 2023, when hidden surcharges more than doubled some advertisers’ cost per click. Amazon timed increases to peak shopping events, the complaint says, because holiday demand would “mask” them. In April 2024 it instructed staff to stop using the word “surcharge” in presentations. By July the internal replacement term was “performance premium” (¶¶ 178–179).

The FTC and the states expanded the case in an updated, largely unredacted complaint—filed October 28, 2026, and announced on November 5—that put numbers and names to the scheme. During the 2021 holiday-period, average cost per click rose about 20%, and some advertisers’ costs rose by more than 200% (¶ 228). An internal memorandum credited the hidden reserves with more than $87 million in added worldwide revenue, achieved with “no advertiser escalations” (¶ 250). Amazon also used the reserves to hit financial targets: in 2023, after noting that Display Ads would “miss” its plan “by $40MM,” the head of Amazon Ads told the senior vice president of ad products and technology, “I’d like to pull out all of the stops (without doing unnatural acts) to close our gaps to plan,” adding that “at least $40MM would be helpful” from reserves (¶ 165). During Prime Day 2023, Amazon’s own team reported surcharge increases of over 100% on one large food and beverage advertiser’s campaigns—more than doubling the second-price result—and an internal report said those campaigns “saw significant CPC increases and ROAS decreases destroying campaign performance” (¶¶ 253—255). And in December 2021, when an advertiser asked whether the second price auction had changed “by design or mistake,” an account manager answered that there was “not a bug, or a change in auction style, so no worries there” (¶ 242).

The reason advertisers could not catch this themselves is also alleged in detail.

Amazon’s reporting aggregated results at the keyword level, blended desktop and mobile, and never itemized what a given click actually cost against what the auction produced. An economist inside Amazon flagged the obvious risk: if “we are running a second price auction, but we aren’t and what we are doing charges the advertisers more,” then “that’s a reputational risk” (¶ 53). A 2023 memo went further, conceding that recent changes “are not right from an economics perspective” and that Amazon was “playing with the auction rules.” (¶¶ 79–80).

The FTC sues under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which reaches unfair or deceptive practices, and seeks a permanent injunction and monetary relief under Section 13(b). The 22 states sue under their own consumer protection statutes—California’s Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law, Washington’s Consumer Protection Act, New York General Business Law sections 349 and 350, and their counterparts elsewhere—seeking injunctions, restitution, rescission of contracts, disgorgement, civil penalties, and fees.

This is a deception and unfair practices case, not a monopolization case. The government did not plead the Sherman Act here. That is a different posture from the Google search, ad-tech, and Play Store cases, where courts found monopoly power and unlawful maintenance of it. The theory against Amazon is that it lied about how it charged, not that it holds and abused monopoly power in an ad market.

Who was harmed?

The government alleges in the Complaint that the scheme reached roughly 1.2 million U.S. advertising customers, including more than 500,000 small and medium-size businesses. Amazon’s advertising arm booked nearly $20 billion in a single recent quarter, and it fell hardest on advertisers who bid high because they trusted the second price promise—the ones who, in Amazon’s own words, “bid far higher than what they are willing to pay” precisely “because they assume its GSP” (¶ 143).

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Author: Paul Moore

On September 30, 2026, Governor Gavin Newsom signed AB 1776, the Competition and Opportunity in Markets for a Prosperous, Equitable and Transparent Economy (COMPETE) Act. Effective January 1, 2027, the law extends California’s Cartwright Act to single-firm monopolization and monopsonization for the first time. New Business and Professions Code section 16731 makes it unlawful to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.

The bill met significant resistance in the Legislature, and the final Act is substantially narrower than the version first proposed. Most significantly, the Legislature:

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Author: Luis Blanquez

Google just paid $700 million in the US to close the domestic front of a war it has already lost twice. This month, the court gave final approval to the settlement resolving the antitrust claims brought by a bipartisan coalition of states, together with a nationwide class of Android users. Judge James Donato of the Northern District of California signaled his approval at an April 2026 hearing, and payments to eligible consumers follow from there.

The number is large, but the shadow of the precedent behind it is even larger. Weeks earlier, the European Court of Justice put the final seal on a €4.1 billion fine for the same company, over the same operating system, and for conduct similar to what the states alleged here. Two legal systems, two very different jurisdictional machines, one defendant—and a question that should interest every company with a platform and a dominant position: which machine really changes a monopoly’s behavior?

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Author: Luis Blanquez

A federal judge in New York recently certified two classes of cryptocurrency buyers against Tether and Bitfinex. If you issue a stablecoin, run an exchange, or make markets in digital assets, that sentence should get your attention. The case, In re Tether and Bitfinex Crypto Asset Litigation, has been running since 2019, and the plaintiffs say the defendants inflated crypto prices by hundreds of billions of dollars. In February 2026, the court said those buyers can sue as a class. In July, the Second Circuit upheld that ruling.

Class certification is the moment a manageable lawsuit becomes an existential one. Before certification, a defendant faces a handful of named plaintiffs and their individual losses. After it, the defendant faces the aggregated claims of everyone who bought in the market during the class period. The dollars change by orders of magnitude, and so does the pressure to settle. That asymmetry is the whole game in class litigation, and it is why the certification order is often the fight that decides the value of the case.

Here, the certification order is actually more useful to defendants than the headline suggests. The plaintiffs got their class, but the court excluded a key piece of their expert analysis, cut both classes down, and set aside the central causation question for a later summary judgment fight.

Before we discuss this in more detail, you should download our Antitrust Guidelines for Companies Using Blockchain Technology.

The Complaint: A Manipulation Theory Built on a Stablecoin

The operative pleading is the Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, filed in June 2020.

Tether issues USDT, a stablecoin it marketed as backed one-to-one by U.S. dollars held in reserve and redeemable on demand. The plaintiffs allege that was a lie—that Tether created USDT out of thin air, without the dollars to back it, and moved the unbacked coins to its affiliated exchange, Bitfinex, without paying for them.

Through an anonymous trader, the defendants allegedly used the debased USDT to make large, well-timed purchases of Bitcoin and other crypto commodities precisely when prices were falling. The market read those purchases as real demand and stopped the slide, which let the defendants convert coins they had created for free into assets with genuine value. The complaint ties the scheme to the 2017 run-up—Bitcoin climbing from roughly $800 to $20,000 in a year—and to the roughly $450 billion in value that evaporated when the bubble burst in 2018. Plaintiffs pleaded claims under the Sherman Act, the Commodity Exchange Act, RICO, common law fraud, and New York’s consumer protection statute.

The lesson in the complaint is that the plaintiffs anchored an ambitious economic theory to concrete, provable conduct: specific issuances of USDT, specific representations about reserves, and specific trades. Regulators had already questioned Tether’s reserve claims. All that together provided the complaint with teeth, which is exactly what most crypto complaints lack and exactly what let this one survive.

The Motion to Dismiss: The Theory Narrows to Antitrust and Commodities

In September 2021, the court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part.

The court threw out the RICO claims, holding that the causal chain between the alleged racketeering and the plaintiffs’ losses was too indirect to satisfy proximate cause. It dismissed the conspiracy to monopolize count and the New York General Business Law claim.

What survived was the core: monopolization and attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the restraint of trade claim under Section 1, and market manipulation and aiding and abetting under the Commodity Exchange Act.

For defendants, the motion to dismiss ruling hides a warning: The claims that fell were the ones that depended on long, attenuated causal chains or strained standing theories. The claims that stuck were the ones tied most directly to the alleged conduct and its market effect. Defendants who treat the motion to dismiss as their last, best chance to end the case tend to be disappointed—the leverage often arrives later, at certification and summary judgment.

Class certification: Only a Partial Win for Plaintiffs

For certification, the plaintiffs relied on an economic expert who offered three analyses: (i) an event study meant to show that USDT issuance caused Bitcoin’s price to rise; (ii) a regression model linking changes in the outstanding volume of USDT to Bitcoin prices; and (iii) an overcharge model quantifying the inflation. The defendants moved to exclude the expert and opposed certification only on adequacy and predominance.

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Authors: Steve Cernak, Luis Blanquez, and Kristen Harris

On May 18, 2026, the FTC and DOJ filed an unopposed motion asking the Fifth Circuit to hold their appeal in abeyance through December 31, 2026. The agencies say they are weighing revisions to the vacated 2024 HSR rule, building on the March 25, 2026 request for information (comments close May 26). They aim to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking by the end of the year and will report to the court every 60 days. The plaintiffs—the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and three other trade associations—do not oppose.

For the back story—the February 12 vacatur in the Eastern District of Texas, the short administrative stay, and the March 19 denial of the FTC’s stay motion—see our earlier post, HSR in Turmoil: Back to the Old Form, at Least For Now.

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Authors: Steve Cernak, Luis Blanquez, and Kristen Harris

On March 19, 2026, the Fifth Circuit denied the FTC’s motion to stay a lower court’s February decision vacating the new HSR form and rules.

As a result, the FTC immediately said it would be accepting the old, less burdensome, form going forward, while recognizing that the agencies continue to wield significant investigatory tools beyond the filing itself At least for the time being, the new form will continue to be accepted too. The FTC will be updating its website with the old form and rules shortly.

The Agency has not announced if it will continue to appeal the lower court’s ruling or re-start the process to develop a different new form. So, the merits appeal remains pending at the Fifth Circuit, meaning the litigation is far from over. A future appellate decision could reinstate the expanded form, require further rulemaking, or affirm the vacatur. For now, however, the legal baseline has reverted to the pre‑2025 HSR regime.

  1. A Sweeping Rulemaking Meets Strong Opposition

In early 2025, the Federal Trade Commission undertook the most ambitious redesign of the Hart‑Scott‑Rodino premerger notification form since the statute was passed in 1976. The dramatically expanded filing framework required parties to submit far more information at the outset of the merger‑review process. The revised form demanded narrative descriptions of competitive dynamics, deeper maps of ownership and governance, detailed horizontal and vertical overlap disclosures, and, often, the submission of certain ordinary‑course business documents never previously required. The stated goal was to help the FTC and the Department of Justice identify problematic deals earlier and reduce friction later in investigations.

The business community was not persuaded. Trade associations, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, argued that the new rule imposed crushing burdens on companies, with compliance costs soaring and preparation time roughly tripling. Many pointed out that the vast majority of HSR filings do not trigger substantial investigations, yet all filers would bear the heightened costs regardless of competitive risk. Even before the rule took effect in February 2025, these groups filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas, claiming the agency had exceeded its statutory authority and failed to justify the new demands.

Their challenge succeeded—at least initially. On February 12, 2026, Judge Jeremy D. Kernodle vacated the rule in its entirety. He found that the agency had not shown the new requirements were “necessary and appropriate” under the HSR Act and had failed to meaningfully weigh costs and benefits as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also found the rule arbitrary and capricious—the FTC failed to show that the rule’s benefits “bear a rational relationship” to its costs. The ruling emphasized that the FTC could not identify even one past transaction that the expanded form would have flagged but the old form would have missed, while acknowledging the enormous cost imposed on every filer. For the court, the disconnect between burden and proven benefit was fatal.

  1. Procedural Whiplash: From Vacatur to Revival

Though the district court vacated the rule, it paused its own order for seven days to allow the FTC to seek appellate relief. The agency scrambled to preserve the status quo. It asked the district court for a stay pending appeal; that request was denied. It then immediately appealed to the Fifth Circuit, filing both an emergency motion for a stay and a separate, narrower request for a short administrative pause.

The Fifth Circuit moved faster than many anticipated. On February 19, 2026—one day before the district court’s stay was set to expire—the appellate court issued an administrative stay of the vacatur “until further order.” The effect was simple but consequential: the 2025 HSR form, despite the district court’s ruling, remained in force. The FTC’s own Premerger Notification Office quickly announced that filers must continue to use the new form while the appeal proceeds.

The court simultaneously set an expedited briefing schedule, requiring the appellees’ response by February 23 and the FTC’s reply by February 26.  On March 19, the court issued a brief per curiam opinion denying the stay. Within hours, the FTC announced on its website that the pre-February 2025 form would be accepted immediately, although filers could also continue using the new form. The FTC expects to further update its website with the old form and rules very soon.

  1. A Landscape of Uncertainty for Dealmakers

Even under the old form, the FTC and DOJ retain broad discretion to request voluntary information during the waiting period.

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Author: Sabri Siraj

In February 2026, Paramount Global signed a $110 billion agreement to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery, setting the stage for one of the largest media combinations in recent memory. The transaction follows a competitive process that included a proposal from Netflix late last year to merge with Warner Bros. Discovery. Netflix ultimately withdrew its bid, citing financial considerations.

While much of the public conversation has centered on personalities and politics, the more meaningful takeaway for businesses lies elsewhere. This transaction offers a clear window into how regulators, both state and federal, are approaching major mergers in industries that are consolidating after years of rapid growth.

For companies contemplating transformative deals in their own sectors, the Paramount–Warner transaction signals an important shift in merger review: agencies are looking beyond simple market share metrics and focusing more closely on how consolidation reshapes long-term competitive dynamics.

Transaction Background

Under the reported agreement, Paramount would acquire Warner Bros. Discovery in a transaction valued at approximately $110 billion, including assumed debt. The combined company would control a substantial portfolio of film studios, premium cable brands, broadcast networks, and direct-to-consumer platforms.

The deal emerges at a time when the media industry is recalibrating. Subscriber growth has slowed, content production costs remain high, and companies are under pressure to improve profitability. In December, Netflix explored strategic transactions involving studio and streaming assets, underscoring the broader industry push toward scale and operational efficiency.

If completed, the merger would reduce the number of diversified, large-scale competitors operating across film production, content licensing, advertising, and subscription services. As a result, the transaction is likely to receive scrutiny from U.S. federal and state and international enforcers.

The Legal Framework Governing the Review

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” The inquiry is forward-looking and predictive. Regulators assess whether a transaction is likely to reduce output, raise prices, diminish innovation, or otherwise weaken competitive rivalry.

In a conventional horizontal merger analysis, agencies examine relevant product and geographic markets, the degree of overlap between the merging firms, and changes in market concentration. Structural indicators often provide the starting point for the analysis.

Modern merger review, however, does not end there. Particularly in capital-intensive industries with relatively few major competitors, agencies increasingly evaluate how consolidation affects incentives and industry structure over time. That broader structural focus is likely to shape review of the Paramount–Warner transaction.

State antitrust enforcers have been increasingly active in reviewing mergers that affect the citizens and consumers of their states. For example, multiple state attorneys-general challenged the Kroger-Albertsons merger. Here, the California Attorney General, at least, has signaled that he plans to investigate the merger.

The Key Signal: Structural Scrutiny in Consolidating Industries

The most instructive aspect of this deal is not simply that two competitors are combining. Rather, it is how enforcement agencies are likely to assess consolidation in a mature, high-fixed-cost industry.

Media production and distribution share structural features common to many other sectors: significant upfront investment, repeated interaction among a limited number of firms, and publicly observable pricing and strategic behavior. When markets exhibit these characteristics, regulators may evaluate not only whether the merged firm could raise prices unilaterally, but also whether reducing the number of independent competitors makes coordinated outcomes more likely.

This coordinated-effects lens focuses on market structure. Agencies may ask whether having fewer major decision-makers increases the risk of parallel pricing behavior, output discipline, or softened rivalry over time—even in the absence of explicit agreement.

That analytical approach has implications far beyond media. Healthcare systems, aerospace and defense contractors, energy infrastructure providers, and industrial manufacturers all operate in industries with high fixed costs and limited numbers of national competitors. In those sectors, consolidation may attract scrutiny not solely because of market share thresholds, but because of how it alters competitive incentives across the industry.

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Author: Ruth E. Glaeser

Federal officials are reportedly considering an antitrust review of major U.S. homebuilders, particularly around how competitors share information through groups like the Leading Builders of America. The Department of Justice has not yet confirmed a formal investigation, but the discussion highlights risks that extend well beyond the largest national builders.

The size and visibility of large builders make them more likely to attract regulatory attention, particularly when housing affordability has become a major political issue. Policymakers are under pressure to examine whether industry practices, or market structure more broadly, are contributing to supply constraints that make housing less affordable.

But for developers of all sizes, this is a reminder that ordinary industry practices can end up under a microscope. Even conduct that seems routine and well-intentioned can become the focus of a costly and disruptive investigation.

The Issue of Trade Associations

At the center of the concern is information sharing among competitors. Trade associations, like Leading Builders of America, serve legitimate and important purposes. They serve as industry advocates, promote best practices, and provide a forum for discussing common challenges among builders. But regulators have long viewed trade associations as environments where competitors may be tempted to share sensitive information.

United States antitrust law does not prohibit companies from participating in trade associations or gathering market intelligence. What it does require is that each company make its own independent decisions about pricing, production, and strategy and not all information sharing is inherently anticompetitive.

Indeed, the DOJ and FTC have long provided guidance on competitor information sharing to help companies understand how antitrust laws apply to things like collaborations, benchmarking, and exchanging data. For many years, the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, issued jointly by the agencies, offered a framework for assessing when information‑sharing and other activities among competitors might raise antitrust concerns. Although the original 2000 Collaboration Guidelines were withdrawn in December 2024, the agencies have recently requested public comment to develop updated guidance that would cover collaborations and information exchanges for today’s economic and technological landscape.

In practice, problems can arise when communications, including informal ones, suggest that competitors are aligning their behavior. Regulators are especially focused on exchanges involving non-public information about future business plans, because that kind of information is more likely to influence how competitors behave and ultimately affect prices, supply, or quality. Emails, text messages, and meeting notes discussing pricing, future plans, or competitors’ actions can appear more nefarious when viewed in hindsight by regulators.

It’s Not Just the Government

Government investigations are only part of the risk. Antitrust scrutiny often leads to follow-on lawsuits by private parties like homebuyers and investors—an antitrust blizzard of sorts—who have an easier time prosecuting their claims by copying the arguments and evidence from the government’s case. Even when defendant companies believe they’ve done nothing wrong, responding to investigations and defending lawsuits can be expensive, time-consuming, and disruptive.

Economic and Market Forces Can Complicate the Picture

Homebuilders also face challenges unique to the industry. Builders operating in the same markets often respond to the same economic pressures at the same time. Interest rates, material costs, labor availability, and local regulations all affect how many homes are built and how they are priced. When mortgage rates rise, demand slows. Builders may respond by adjusting pricing, slowing production, or delaying projects. Similarly, when lumber prices increase or labor becomes scarce, builders may raise prices or build fewer homes. Local regulation can have the same effect—zoning restrictions, permitting delays, and approval timelines often affect every builder in a given area. Supply chain disruptions can create similar patterns. And if materials are delayed or unavailable, multiple builders may pause or reschedule construction.

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Author: Steven Cernak

U.S. antitrust laws make exceptions for certain actions by employees and employers in the collective bargaining context. The limits of those exemptions are not perfectly clear. Earlier this month, a district court seemed to clarify and expand the so-called nonstatutory exemption for activities by employers.

Labor Exemption Basics

Between 1890 and 1914, courts generally viewed as illegal under the Sherman Act concerted activities by employees to obtain union recognition. To change that situation, beginning with the Clayton Act in 1914, Congress created what became known as the “statutory labor exemption,” which states in part:

Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor … organizations, … or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof

Later, the Supreme Court developed a corresponding “nonstatutory labor exemption” to allow employers, within certain limits, to reach agreement among themselves as they jointly bargained with the unionized employees. Generally, courts have restricted the nonstatutory exemption to agreements 1) related to a mandatory subject of bargaining such as wages, hours, and working conditions; 2) not having a potential for restraining competition in the business market in which the employers compete; and 3) that arise in the collective bargaining context and, often, when the employers have explicitly created a multiemployer bargaining unit.

For example, the Ninth Circuit in California v. Safeway in 2011found an anticompetitive agreement among four grocery stores who agreed to share profits during a union strike against any one of them. Because only three of the stores created a multiemployer bargaining unit while the union contract with the fourth did not expire for several months, the court was concerned that the profit-sharing agreement was “not anchored in the collective bargaining process.” Also, the court found the agreement did not concern a core mandatory subject of bargaining and could affect the business, rather than the labor, markets in which the companies competed.

Morgan v. The Kroger Co.

On February 6, 2026, the district court in Colorado granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in Morgan v. The Kroger Co. Grocery stores owned by Kroger and Albertsons, respectively, were separately bargaining with the same union over agreements that ended at the same time. The two employers discussed but never reached a mutual strike assistance agreement. Albertsons briefly extended its agreement, Kroger did not, the union struck Kroger before shortly thereafter reaching an agreement, and Albertsons largely agreed to those same terms.

Just before the strike, the union publicly encouraged Kroger employees to move their pharmacy purchases to and seek employment at the Albertsons stores in the event of a strike. A high-ranking Kroger labor executive emailed his Albertsons counterpart to ask how that company planned to react to such union tactics. The Albertsons executive responded:

  1. We don’t intend to hire any [Kroger] employees and we have

already advised the Safeway division of our position and the

division agrees.

  1. With regards to Rx, we don’t intend to solicit or publicly

communicate that [Kroger] employees should transfer their scripts

to us. However, when a customer brings in a new or transferred

script, we don’t inquire as to why the customer is transferring or

where they work, nor do we make it a practice to turn away

customers.

Others within Albertsons described this exchange as an “agreement” not to hire Kroger employees and not to solicit Kroger pharmacy customers. Originally, plaintiff alleged this agreement violated Colorado state antitrust law but planned to amend to add federal claims. All parties and the court used federal antitrust precedent.

While finding it a close question, the court dismissed the state law claim (and said it would have dismissed any similar federal antitrust law claims) under the nonstatutory labor exemption. While defendants could not cite a case that applied the exemption outside of a multiemployer bargaining unit, the court found it more telling that the plaintiff could not cite a case holding that the exemption could not apply to a case of employers engaged in parallel, bilateral negotiations with the same union.

The court distinguished Safeway on two grounds. First, here both collective bargaining agreements ended at nearly the same time while in Safeway the agreement of the non-member of the multiemployer unit ended several months later. Second, unlike the profit-sharing agreement in Safeway, here any agreement that Albertsons would not hire Kroger employees operated only in the labor market, not the product market where the two employers compete. The court characterized the pharmacy discussion as, at most, communication by Albertsons “that it would not start to actively solicit Kroger employees’ prescriptions, thereby maintaining the status quo.”

Takeaways

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Author: Luis Blanquez

Congress didn’t set out to redesign money with the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act. Yet that is where the debate has now landed. The bill—intended to end regulation‑by‑enforcement and draw a workable line between SEC and CFTC authority—has stalled because stablecoins force a choice the status quo would rather avoid. Are digital dollars going to be corralled into a bank‑shaped box, or will they remain programmable cash that pressures incumbents to compete on yield, speed, and service? Everything else is downstream of that decision.

Banks, Stablecoins and the Need for Real Competition

Stablecoins have become the functional rails of crypto today—payment instruments, settlement media, and trading collateral—sometimes accompanied by yields from lending, reserve income, or activity‑based rewards. Banks see this as deposit‑like remuneration without bank‑level prudential rules. And they warn of deposit flight and regulatory arbitrage.

Senate negotiators have responded with draft provisions that limit “interest for simply holding a stablecoin,” while permitting some incentives tied to real activity (e.g., payments volume). Crypto firms counter that this approach smuggles the legacy model back in: if a fully reserved, transparent stablecoin can’t share its economics with users or experiment with market incentives, what exactly is the innovation? And if tokenized assets are pushed back into broker‑dealer rails, how meaningful is on‑chain finance?

This is not a sterile policy scuffle. It’s a market‑structure fork. Treat stablecoins like quasi‑deposits with minimal yield and centralized chokepoints, and you’ll get the same existing incumbent-protection and innovation-fenced banking channels. Treat them as programmable, interoperable dollars with risk‑appropriate guardrails, and you’ll get competition—on rates, UX, interoperability, and transparency.

Base—Coinbase’s Layer‑2 Network

Meanwhile, the market is already revealing the tradeoffs. Consider Base—Coinbase’s Layer‑2 on Ethereum’s OP Stack. It solves real problems: cheaper transactions, faster confirmation, and effortless ramps. It is the rare bridge from Web2 familiarity to Web3 innovation, powered by the distribution of an innovative public company. A very successful project so far indeed.

But Base also shows how “Web3‑branded” platforms can quietly recreate Web2 chokepoints. Today, a single sequencer—run by Coinbase—controls transaction ordering, inclusion, and liveness. Users can self‑custody, yet the network’s heartbeat depends on one operator.

At the asset layer, USDC, a stablecoin co‑created by Coinbase and Circle, is the default settlement currency. This is unsurprising given reserve‑yield economics and compliance benefits. While other tokens can technically be used on Base, the user experience strongly privileges USDC, shaping behavior through design rather than choice. None of this makes Base malign; it makes Base effective. But it also makes it an ecosystem managed by corporate incentives rather than a neutral public protocol.

The Bitcoin and Nostr Lesson: Protocols as Antidotes to Chokepoints

Here’s where Bitcoin and Nostr matter as living proof that open protocols can scale human coordination without reintroducing gatekeepers.

Bitcoin is bearer money with credible neutrality. There is no issuer to lean on, no off‑chain promise to redeem, no corporate switch to flip. With Lightning, small payments settle in native BTC without bridges or custodial wrapping. That architecture prevents a single firm from deciding who transacts, in what order, or at what fee. It’s not frictionless; liquidity management and UX remain hard. But Bitcoin/Lightning delivers something corporate L2s cannot promise: a censorship‑resistant exit option. When “Web3‑branded” stacks drift toward walled gardens, the mere availability of a neutral settlement layer disciplines behavior—users and developers can route around control points.

Nostr offers the same lesson for communications. It is a simple, open event protocol for publishing and relaying messages. There are no accounts to seize, no central servers to pressure, and no mandatory app store chokepoints. Anyone can run a relay, anyone can build a client, and identities travel with the user, not the platform. Like Bitcoin, Nostr isn’t perfect: spam resistance, moderation norms, and discovery are hard. But its permissionless interoperability and portable identity prevent the quiet re‑centralization that Web2 perfected and “Web3‑branded” platforms sometimes emulate. In practice, Nostr and Lightning together show how value and speech can move across a network where the rules are baked into open code rather than corporate policy.

The point isn’t to crown Bitcoin and Nostr as universal solutions (although we think highly of them): It’s to recognize their governance properties—credible neutrality, forkability, non‑discriminatory access—as the antidote to the chokepoints corporate platforms tend to recreate nowadays.

How Corporate L2s Can Earn Trust—and Avoid Antitrust Trouble

The solution isn’t to reject polished, easy‑to‑use platforms. It’s to make sure that as these networks grow, they don’t quietly become new chokepoints. Base—and any corporate‑run Layer‑2—could earn long‑term trust by committing to three simple principles:

Decentralize the Infrastructure

Right now, Base relies on a single sequencer. To avoid becoming a gatekeeper, it should eventually open this role to many independent operators. That means multiple entities helping order transactions, clear rules preventing any one party from dominating, and technical safeguards so users can always get their transactions included—or withdraw to Ethereum—if something goes wrong.

Neutralize the Asset Layer

If the network defaults to USDC everywhere, people will naturally end up using it—even if they’d prefer something else. Base could avoid that by offering a neutral asset picker and allowing different stablecoins, ETH, and even non‑custodial Bitcoin payment paths, to truly compete on equal footing. It should also separate any reserve income from network decisions and make switching between assets or providers easy and low‑cost.

Build Fair, Transparent Governance

To avoid ever looking like a walled garden, Base could give more groups a seat at the table, such as developers, users, and independent voices. Clear rules against self‑preferencing, public audits, transparent fee policies, and easy data portability, all would make the ecosystem more antitrust friendly.

These three steps aren’t just good crypto hygiene. They are antitrust risk reducers. The legal vulnerability for a dominant exchange‑wallet‑L2 bundle is the appearance of leveraging distribution power to foreclose rivals—by steering order flow, setting biased defaults, or discriminating in access. Open sequencers, neutral defaults, and documented non‑discrimination would make Base look less like a vertically integrated gatekeeper and more like neutral infrastructure.

What Congress Should Do

Policy should reflect the same principles.

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