The Republican-Democrat Duopoly: Harvard Business Review Authors Ask for More Competition in Politics

July 6, 2020 | Bona Law PC

As antitrust attorneys, we advocate for competition in product and service markets. The US Supreme Court recognizes that “the heart of our national economy long as been faith in the value of competition,” and we agree.

But competition matters elsewhere too. We certainly see it in sports. You might notice that sport leagues strive to increase parity to make the league more competitive overall. So when your favorite NFL Football team creates twelve to sixteen sleepless nights for you one year, the league rewards it with a high draft pick the next year. And if your team wins more than it loses, the NFL scheduling gods will punish them the next year with a tougher path to the playoffs.

Anyway, if you read the Harvard Business Review, you may have noticed an article that is sure to pique the interest of an antitrust lawyer like myself. (July-August 2020 Issue). It isn’t about sports, but it is still interesting.

Katherine M. Gehl and Michael E. Porter wrote “Fixing U.S. Politics: What business can—and must—do to revitalize democracy.”

Everyone seems unhappy with the current state of political affairs—so maybe more competition is the solution?

(This is a good reminder that every profession—including antitrust attorney—sees solutions to problems through their own, very specific, eyes. Knee injury? You need more competition. Of course, it isn’t always effective.)

Before we jump into Gehl and Porter’s work, as a disclaimer, Bona Law isn’t a political law firm: we don’t take any specific positions on politics or candidates. Our firm is made up of actual people, all of whom have freedom of thought and their own individual views, which we respect. As a firm, we take positions on certain types of policy—like encouraging competition and discouraging the government from destroying competition. But Bona Law is an antitrust law firm, so that’s not a surprise. But when it comes to politics, that is for each person to decide for themselves. Politics is personal.

According to the authors, politics are driven by the same five forces that affect more traditional markets: “the nature and intensity of rivalry, the power of buyers, the power of suppliers, the threat of new entrants, and the pressure from substitutes that compete in new ways.” (117). The authors explain that—unfortunately—the politics industry doesn’t have healthy competition.

The key problem, according to the authors, is that the Democrats and Republicans have a duopoly and that they work hard to keep it that way—with great success.

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Certificate-of-Need Laws, Evil Trolls, and the Minneapolis Star Tribune

April 29, 2020 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

We do our best to describe antitrust and other legal issues as straightforwardly as possible here. We tend to speak directly and avoid the guarded language that you often see from lawyers elsewhere (a little secret: most big-firm attorneys are afraid of getting in trouble in one way or another).

So, in case there was any doubt, I’ll tell you what I really think of certificate-of-need laws. These are laws, still on the books in many states, that actually require a new healthcare provider that wants to move into a market to get permission from the state to do so (a certificate of need). And, even more bizarre, the existing competitors—who certainly don’t want any more competition—often have a say or a role in whether the new provider receives a certificate of need, which can sometimes take months or years to obtain, if at all.

We hear all the time how important health and safety is: The sanctity of human life. Take care of yourself. Eat well. Exercise. Get your yearly physical. Follow your doctor’s advice.

We also hear complaints from every politician, news agency, and anyone that’s ever paid a medical bill about the costs of health care.

And, although healthcare workers have been heroes both before and during this pandemic, I think we would all agree that there is a lot of room for improvement in healthcare in the United States. I’ve been to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota many times and my son was born there, so I know how good healthcare can be. We have a lot of room to improve healthcare as a country.

I think we can all agree that healthcare is vitally important to us as human beings. That is what I hear the media tell me and what politicians preach all the time. And this makes sense: If you are sick or dying, getting better shoots up the priority list of needs and wants.

Switching gears briefly, here is something that I’ve learned as an antitrust attorney and as a student of economics: Markets with monopolists and markets with less competition have higher prices, lower supply, and lower quality for products and services.

Let’s say you are an evil troll that hates people. Let’s also say that you have the single opportunity to pass legislation in a state to hurt human beings that care about health and healthcare, but you don’t want it to be something that is so obvious that they’d just repeal it after your opportunity passes. You want something that is sneaky bad.

What would you do if you were that evil troll?

You’d pass certificate-of-need laws.

These laws are sneaky bad because it takes a couple steps of reasoning to see how they harm our health and healthcare. By creating the barrier to entry of these certificate-of-need laws, the evil troll can artificially limit the supply of healthcare, decrease its quality, and raise healthcare costs—almost without detection. And by offering the existing monopolist or provider an opportunity to participate in the process, the government agency is much less likely to award the certificate to improve people’s lives. At the very least, if the existing healthcare provider is involved, they will be able to help delay any competition.

Let’s say that you end up with a pandemic and really need a lot of hospital beds or other healthcare all at once. If that happens, the evil troll has won because their certificate-of-need laws are specifically designed to reduce the supply of healthcare, including hospital beds.

Bona Law opposes certificate of need laws and we call for their repeal and challenge. You can read our earlier article about certificate of need laws on this website here.

On April 28, 2020, Aaron Gott and I published an article in the Minneapolis Star Tribune entitled “State Certificate-of-Need Laws for Hospitals Must Go: These anti-competition laws have left us unprepared for the current pandemic, with fewer hospital beds for care.”

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COVID-19 Exposes Evil of Anticompetitive State Certificate of Need Laws

March 23, 2020 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Aaron Gott and Jarod Bona

The United States is in lockdown to “flatten the curve” of COVID-19 cases because our hospital system has even less capacity to handle a surge of cases than Italy—where overload has led physicians to have to make tough decisions about which patients deserve treatment priority. New York, the U.S. epicenter of the coronavirus, is expected to reach capacity in a matter of days and some hospitals have already exceeded their intensive-care capacity.

Hundreds of thousands of people may die directly as a result of inadequate hospital capacity in the United States, which is at its lowest in decades. In fact, the U.S. had nearly 8 hospital beds per 1,000 people in 1970, a number that has steadily declined to 2.9 per 1000 people today. Our elected officials have issued orders and recommendations that have our economy screeching to a halt, while Congress is considering unprecedented economic relief measures in the trillions of dollars to soften the fallout.

What put us in this position? There are many reasons. But one major culprit that is at least partially to blame for our current predicament has been nearly 50 years in the making: state certificate of public need laws (often called CON laws) that artificially limit the supply of hospital beds and medical equipment.

In 1974, Congress passed the National Health Planning Resources Development Act, which encouraged states to enact certificate-of-need laws for medical capital investment. Nearly every state enacted them. State bureaucrats, rather than the free market, would thereafter determine whether we “need” more ICU capacity, more testing labs, and more equipment like ventilators. The idea behind CON laws, proven wrong long before COVID-19, is that allowing states to control supply would reduce runaway healthcare costs and improve access to care.

Here is how a CON law generally works: it is illegal (often with criminal consequences) to build any kind of medical facility or make a capital medical equipment purchase without first obtaining a certificate allowing you to do so from the state health agency. It can cost millions of dollars and take several years to get one, if you can get one at all. In some states, your competitors have a right to object to the issuance of the certificate. In the worst states, monopolist and oligopolist hospital systems prevent competition because they have such a stranglehold on state bureaucrats and processes that most would-be competitors don’t even bother trying to get a certificate of need.

New York, by the way, is one of those states that still has a draconian certificate of need law on its books. New York requires a certificate of need for the “establishment, construction, renovation and major medical equipment acquisitions of health care facilities.” Any project that would add new hospital and/or ICU beds would require a certificate of need, and it is likely that adding new ICU-grade ventilators would also require a certificate of need because they individually cost tens of thousands of dollars.

New York has just 3,200 ICU beds but expects it will need between 18,600 and 37,200 to handle the expected wave of hospitalizations.

As antitrust and competition lawyers, certificate of need laws long have been on our minds. They are terrible, immoral policies even in the best of times.

We’re not alone in this thinking: even Congress quickly saw the error of its ways. In 1984, recognizing that the program was a failure, Congress repealed the provisions that encouraged certificate of need laws. Some states repealed their CON laws in the years since, but 35 states still have them on the books, largely because monopolist and oligopolist healthcare systems don’t like competition, and they have lobbying strangleholds over many state legislatures.

For years, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission have jointly pleaded for states to repeal their anticompetitive certificate of need laws (and criticism of CONs features prominently in their comprehensive guide on improving competition in healthcare). Yet states still have them, and courts have often refused to strike them down under the U.S. Constitution despite their disastrous effect on interstate commerce.

One example is Colon Health Centers v. Hazel, a case by our friends at the Institute of Justice challenging the constitutionality of Virginia’s parochial certificate-of-need law under the dormant Commerce Clause. The plaintiffs in that case sought to open state-of-the-art clinics with MRI machines and CT scanners that would improve and cheapen certain types of cancer screenings, but they could not do so without first risking millions of dollars in a certificate of need process that was likely to be contested by existing providers, eventually resulting in denial.

We filed an amicus brief on behalf of law and economics scholars in that case to argue that states’ claims of cost-controlling benefits of CON laws are unsupported by empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit upheld the law on summary judgment, finding that the putative benefits of the law were not speculative (even in the face of evidence showing no such benefit), and that those benefits outweighed the effect the law has on interstate commerce.

That case may have been decidedly differently if it were heard today.

Now, in the face of an unprecedented pandemic and an economy that has come screeching to a halt as a result of shelter-in-place orders and social distancing recommendations—put in place primarily to “flatten the curve” and avoid the overload our inadequately supply of healthcare facilities—these laws have proven not just ineffective, but completely unconscionable.

More importantly, CON laws could now prevent us from quickly building up temporary medical infrastructure to deal with the surge of cases. We cannot rely on government alone to rise to the occasion with military resources; CON laws must get out of the way so that private enterprise can help fill in the gaps.

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Applying the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive State and Local Government Conduct

September 1, 2019 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

Lawyers, judges, economists, law professors, policy-makers, business leaders, trade-association officials, students, juries, and the readers of this blog combined spend incredible resources—time, money, or both—analyzing whether certain actions or agreements are anticompetitive or violate the antitrust laws.

While superficially surprising, upon deeper reflection it makes sense because less competition in a market dramatically affects the prices, quantity, and quality of what companies supply in that market. In the aggregate, the economic effect is huge, thus justifying the resources we spend “trying to get it right.” Of course, in trying to get it right, we often muck it up even more by discouraging procompetitive agreements by over-applying the antitrust laws.

So perhaps we should focus our resources on the actions that are most likely to harm competition (and by extension, all of us)?

Well, one place we can start is by concentrating on conduct that is almost always anticompetitive—price-fixing and market allocation among competitors, as well as bid-rigging. We have the per se rule for that. Check.

There is another significant source of anticompetitive conduct, however, that is often ignored by the antitrust laws. Indeed, a doctrine has developed surrounding these actions that expressly protect them from antitrust scrutiny, no matter how harmful to competition and thus our economy.

As a defender and believer in the virtues of competition, I am personally outraged that most of this conduct has a free pass from antitrust and competition laws that regulate the rest of the economy, and that there aren’t protests in the street about it.

What has me so upset?

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Blocked from Competing in Your Market? You are Not Alone

May 6, 2019 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

Business can be brutal.

Let’s say you have this business. Maybe you started it recently, or maybe you’ve been around for some time. But, in any event, you offer a good product or service. Customers like you and you are making money.

This is—for many—the American dream. You have freedom, which plays itself out by your decision to exercise that freedom by working 80 hours per week. But you are working those 80 hours for your baby—your business.

And at least you have control over your circumstances: If you keep providing your customers with great value at a great price, you will succeed.

That’s true, except sometimes it isn’t.

Competing for customers in a market isn’t just about providing the best services, products, or prices. That is, of course, the biggest part of it, most of the time. If you do well for your customers, they will usually do well for you. But sometimes it is more complicated than that.

Companies compete within markets, but they also compete for markets.

What does that mean?

Let’s say you own a restaurant and there are five restaurants on your street. You compete within the market because whoever offers the best combination of atmosphere, price, and quality and can best match the needs (i.e. demand) of the prospective restaurant customers in that geographic area will make the most money. That is competing within the market.

But the more competition there is, the harder it is to make money. Every market is different, of course, but the greater the differentiation among competitors within the market and the less competition within that market, the more profit margins increase. This, of course, is just a rough approximation. Markets are complicated beasts.

The truth is, if you want to make more money as a business, it is best to avoid or minimize competition. That is why Peter Thiel tells you in Zero to One to create new markets or to build businesses that will face minimal competition. In that sense, a restaurant is a terrible business—too much competition. We wrote about avoiding competition and Peter Thiel’s excellent book here.

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Can Antitrust Law Save Innovative Ideas and Freedom of Speech?

April 7, 2019 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

We are all connected. When something happens anywhere, we know about it everywhere. If someone has a great idea, they can tell everyone about it, right away.

These connections create incredible value. We as a society can take the best ideas and build upon them. Information as a resource is incredibly cheap and easily available. Filtering is the real problem now, but more on that later.

So, this is all great, but I worry. There is a downside to this over-connectedness. But more on that later.

There was once a time when people were worried that government would suppress speech, ideas, and innovation. The government still does this, of course. But it seems like there is less worry about it. In many ways, the government doesn’t have as much power as it used to have. That is, in part, because of our connectedness.

Society can speak swiftly and harshly toward government action that is excessive, unfair, or wrong (in society’s judgment). This creates a check on government conduct, in the same way that many people used to consider the press the fourth branch of government. Indeed, the collective voice of the people on social media has all but replaced the press, who now, like everyone else, tend to mostly pick sides.

Society, of course, doesn’t speak in one voice, but a conventional wisdom often develops and if you don’t follow it, you are criticized, harshly. This isn’t the case for every issue, obviously, but for many.

Back in the old days, speech took place in public forums—maybe a park, a conventional hall, or even a mall. That still happens, but you can only reach so many people at one place (unless you video it and post it on YouTube, for example). So the government’s role in this type of speech is much less.

Some influential speech still takes place on television. But people seem to be watching that less and less. Now, the most influential speech takes place online, mostly filtered through technology and social media companies like Google, Twitter, Facebook, etc.

I’ve mentioned the term “filter” several times now. There is so much content on these platforms that if you don’t filter it, the amount is so overwhelming, it just isn’t useful. Most people don’t have time to go through everything everyone says. So a filter is necessary.

If the government were to “filter” the speech at a public park, the ACLU and a bunch of other organizations would file a First Amendment Lawsuit, and that is a good thing.

But now, the most influential forums for speech must be filtered. But how? I am not sure any one person really knows. The technology and social media companies use something called an algorithm to do the work. That seems like it could be a good idea, assuming the algorithm is a good one. But how do we know?

Should the algorithm vary depending upon the recipient information stream? Again, that seems like a good idea. Having something completely customized for you is sort of fancy and certainly helpful. We all have different interests, needs, etc. But we all have “views” on certain issues too. As we develop wisdom, experience, and knowledge, those ideas should evolve and, in some cases, change dramatically. My views are not the same as they were twenty years ago. Yours probably weren’t either.

The idea that each of us has plastic unchanging views on everything from the origins of the universe to how to run a business to the most controversial political topics of the day is foolish.

But an algorithm that sends you a customized information stream is likely to send you a disproportionate amount of information that matches your present views and interests. In a way, that locks you into where you are—inhibiting your own growth. What if we aggregate that to, well, everyone on the planet that is on the internet. Uh oh!

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Marketplace Bullying and Bona Law’s Antitrust Lawsuit in the Cement and Ready Mix Concrete Markets

August 16, 2017 | Bona Law PC

Bona Law filed an antitrust lawsuit on behalf of our client in the Northern District of Georgia alleging antitrust violations in the cement and ready mix concrete markets. More on that later.

But first I am going to tell you a fictional story about your nine-year-old son and his first entrepreneurial endeavor. If you don’t want to hear about your son, you can skip to the next section, about Bona Law’s new case.

The Lemonade Stand

You don’t have a nine-year-old son? Well … you do for this story. Congratulations, it’s a boy!

As you know, your son’s name is Johnny. You call him Little Johnny, but he is growing so fast, you are not sure how much longer the “Little” will last. But you treasure these times because they grow up so quickly.

And speaking of growing up quickly, Johnny sure is maturing. You tried to get him to clean-up around the house for an allowance, but he turned you down. He said he doesn’t want to be an employee and taking a job with you will just lead him into the rat race. Why would he want to do that?

Instead, Johnny says, he wants to start his own business. Ownership is where the money is, he says. Johnny wants to build cash flow, so he can just skip the rat race. Smart kid.

Okay, you say, “why don’t you start a lemonade stand?”

Johnny is excited. This is his first business—his first taste of Capitalism!

“Yes, I’ll build the best lemonade stand in the neighborhood, will serve the best tasting lemonade, and will be very careful with my costs, so I can charge a lower price and sell the most lemonade.”

Apparently Johnny has been paying attention to the business podcasts you have been listening to in the car.

As you know, you just moved to a wonderful neighborhood in the San Diego area. After years on the east coast, dealing with the harsh weather and sometimes harsh people, you are excited that you are now in paradise. The weather is incredible all year here and the constant sunshine puts you in a great mood.

Of course, it is tough to move to a new area, especially for kids. Johnny is excited, but a little nervous. He doesn’t know many kids in the neighborhood yet, and doesn’t start school until the fall—it is still July.

You and he have both noticed, however, that the neighborhood has a few lemonade stands—and many thirsty neighbors—so this might be a good way for him to make some friends and get to know the neighborhood.

You help Johnny build a stand, but to his credit he does most of the work—his enthusiasm for the venture has produced a work ethic in him you’ve never seen. You also admire his efforts to plan out his purchase of supplies, opting for Costco so he can buy what he needs in bulk at a low cost per glass (as he explained to you).

Johnny now has everything ready for his business: a stand with an attractive sign, cups, a money box, raw materials to make lemonade, a cooler, a couple chairs for him and his friend (or you, when you want to stop by), and, most importantly, the joy of ownership from starting his own business. You’ve never seen him so happy.

You drive around the neighborhood with him and discover that other kids seem to be selling lemonade at $7 per glass, which seems a little high, but it is a wealthy neighborhood, so perhaps that is the market price? It has been a warm, surprisingly humid summer in San Diego. You discuss with Johnny how that weather pattern increases demand. Of course, it did seem odd to you that everyone was selling lemonade at exactly $7 per glass, but you dismiss it.

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The Antitrust Laws Do Not Allow Real Estate Agents to Jointly Fix or Set Prices or Commissions

June 19, 2017 | Bona Law PC

If you have sold or purchased a home recently, you might be under the impression that real estate commissions—the price to engage a real estate broker—are fixed or otherwise set by law in different geographic markets. They aren’t—to do so amounts to price-fixing, which is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.

Like any other competitor—professional or not—real estate brokers and agents must compete for customer business on price, quality, and everything else. If competing professionals were to join together to fix commissions at a set price, they would violate the antitrust laws. And since it would be a per se violation, there are potential criminal penalties.

In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, is engaged in prosecuting some other real-estate participants for per se antitrust violations—bid rigging: Several Northern California real-estate investors have pled guilty for bid rigging public real estate foreclosure auctions. Similar bid rigging of foreclosure auctions apparently occurred in Georgia, as well. We wrote about these bid rigging investigations long ago when DOJ’s antitrust activity was in its early stages.

But let’s return to real estate brokers and commissions: It is true that in most geographic regions, you see commissions at around the same level, no matter who you hire as a real estate agent. That will sometimes happen in a market; there is a rate that is around the market rate and most will price around that rate. We wrote a prior article about this situation, where real estate commissions ended up at the same level, but not due to any agreement. This was not an antitrust violation.

For some reason, however, there is an impression with real estate commissions that there is a “standard” or “legal” rate that real estate agents must price. If you are a consumer in this industry, it is important that you know that this is absolutely incorrect. If your real estate broker tells you otherwise, have them read one of our most popular articles: Five Antitrust Concerns for Real Estate Professionals.

Then, go ahead and negotiate. That is your right. You don’t have a right to win the negotiation, but real estate agents don’t have a right to agree among each other on prices either.

If you are a competitor for real estate services, it is particularly important that you understand that you can’t fix prices with other agents. If you do, you might find yourself on the wrong side of an antitrust lawsuit—possibly even brought by Bona Law—as we receive a lot of calls and emails about these issues. Or, worse, you could receive a call from a Department of Justice lawyer that opened an investigation into you or your company.

My interest in this issue goes beyond my role running a boutique antitrust law firm: I am also a long time real estate investor and I have a California real estate license. To capitalize on that background, we recently started a new blog directed at real estate investors, called Titles & Deeds. If you want to learn more, you can read about our real estate blog here.

This, of course, leads us to Kansas. I bet you didn’t see that coming. Let me explain.

Are the Kansas Real Estate Commission and its Members About to Violate the Antitrust Laws?

On June 16, 2017, Andrew Finch, Acting Assistant Attorney General for DOJ, wrote a letter to the Kansas Real Estate Commission expressing concern about a regulation the Commission is considering that would make it easier to fix prices by forbidding real estate brokers from competing on price by offering gift cards or similar items.

Apparently, according to the DOJ law, Kansas state law forbids real estate brokers from offering rebates, but doesn’t define the term “rebates.” The Kansas state ban, of course, is highly anticompetitive. It directly restricts price competition and harms consumers in Kansas. The Kansas government has unfortunately chosen to protect profits in the real estate profession over the well-being of its citizens.

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Active Supervision and State Action Immunity for Licensing Boards Controlled by Market Participants

November 12, 2015 | Bona Law PC

In early 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC that the “active state supervision” prong of the state-action immunity from antitrust liability test applied to state licensing boards controlled by market participants. You can read my analysis of the decision here. And you can read the amicus brief that Bona Law filed in the case here.

(Besides the “active state supervision” requirement, state-action-immunity applicants must also demonstrate that the challenged restraint was clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy by a state sovereign, like a state legislature. The Supreme Court recently addressed this requirement in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. I filed an amicus brief in this case, which you can review here.)

Update: The FTC applied its Active State Supervision criteria in an enforcement action against the Louisiana Real Estate Appraisers Board.

The Basics of Antitrust Liability and State-Action Immunity for State Regulatory Boards

I have written quite a bit about state action immunity and the NC Dental case, so I won’t give a lot of background here. You can read my prior articles.

But here are the basics: Not surprisingly, state and local governments often engage in anticompetitive behavior. Sometimes this includes conduct that the federal antitrust laws prohibit.

But, owing to federalism and the fact that governments get away with things they shouldn’t, sometimes state and federal governments have a get-out-of-antitrust-liability card called “state-action immunity.” Like all antitrust exemptions, Courts interpret the scope of state-action immunity narrowly.

In most situations, a state or local government seeking state-action immunity must demonstrate that (1) the state sovereign—usually the legislature or state supreme court acting legislatively—clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed the challenged restraint as state policy (See Phoebe Putney); and (2) that the state actively supervises the anticompetitive policy.

Before the US Supreme Court decided the NC Dental case, it was an open question whether state licensing or regulatory boards were required to show both prongs of what is called the Midcal test, or just the first prong. That is, it wasn’t a given that these state boards had to show active supervision. I addressed that very issue in a law review article, which you can read here. But apparently my article wasn’t enough to end discussion on the issue, so the US Supreme Court went ahead and addressed it in the NC Dental v. FTC case.

The Supreme Court in NC Dental went on to hold that a state board on which a controlling number of decision-makers are market participants in the regulated occupation must satisfy the active supervision requirement to invoke state-action antitrust immunity.

(As an aside, certain municipalities do not need to show active state supervision, but I suspect that courts will continue to narrow this exception. Luke Wake and I argued in another law review article that whenever the government entity becomes a market-participant, it should lose its state-action immunity entirely. I mention this here because it is often a local government entity that competes directly in the market and tries to invoke state-action immunity.).

So we now know that anticompetitive conduct by state regulatory boards are subject to antitrust scrutiny unless they can show both prongs of the Midcal test, including active state supervision. But what is active state supervision?

What is Active State Supervision for State-Action Immunity from Antitrust?

Active Supervision is something that the US Supreme Court has on occasion addressed, but there isn’t a clear standard. It simply hasn’t come up enough to create a dense body of law. So the guidance is slim.

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Texas Federal Court Acts for Teladoc in Antitrust Case Against State Medical Board

June 10, 2015 | Bona Law PC

It is easier to succeed in business without competition than with it. And if you are used to practicing your profession in a particular way, it is quite uncomfortable when new approaches develop that undercut your business.

(As an aside, Aaron Gott and I just published an article for CIO Story that discussed this idea in the context of the legal profession: Disrupting the Traditional Law Firm Model.)

Indeed, the first reaction is that the “guild” scrambles to find ways to stop the newcomers, often citing health, safety, or consumer protection reasons to cover what are, in fact, really actions of self-preservation. Several years ago, I published a law review article called “The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,” that discussed the antitrust implications of this problem.

North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC

More recently, the United States Supreme Court decided a case called North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state board made up of dentists was not immune from the antitrust laws when it collectively acted to limit the market for teeth-whitening to dentists.

In the NC Dental case, dentists noticed that their high-margin teeth-whitening was facing lower-priced competition from non-dentists. They predictably reacted by citing health, safety, and consumer concerns and did what they could—collectively—to destroy their competitors and thus their competition.

That they did so through what was, in fact, a state board was no concern to the US Supreme Court because when an entity—even a state entity—is made up of a group of competitors it is in many ways just like a private trade association. If the competitors collectively violate the antitrust laws by excluding competition, they must face antitrust liability.

What the Supreme Court did not do in NC Dental, however, is determine the scope of what is an antitrust violation. For that, we must turn to basic antitrust doctrine. And like any other antitrust application, doctrine develops around different types of actions and situations.

One pertinent example, of course, is the state board made up of private competitors that seek to exclude their competition. The scope of antitrust liability—separate and apart from any state-action immunity issues—is an underdeveloped area of antitrust doctrine because there weren’t a great many cases of this nature.

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